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CONSTITUTIONAL CULPABILITY: QUESTIONING THE  
NEW EXCLUSIONARY RULES 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson* 
Abstract 
 
This Article addresses the questions left unanswered by the Supreme 
Court’s recent exclusionary rule cases. The Hudson-Herring-Davis 
trilogy presents a new and largely unexamined doctrinal landscape for 
Fourth Amendment suppression hearings. Courts, litigators, and 
scholars are only now assessing what has changed on the ground in trial 
practice. Once an automatic remedy for any constitutional violation, the 
exclusionary rule now necessitates a separate and more searching 
analysis. Rights and remedies have been decoupled, such that a clear 
Fourth Amendment constitutional violation may not lead to the 
exclusion of evidence. Instead, it now leads to an examination of the 
conduct of the law enforcement officer—conduct that if not sufficiently 
“culpable” does not require exclusion. This Article analyzes the 
doctrinal moves of a Supreme Court focused on constitutional 
culpability and raises questions about the evolving doctrine’s 
implication for trial practice. The Article then suggests several 
responses for lawyers and courts approaching this new reality. 
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[I]f the Court means what it now says, if it would place 
determinative weight upon the culpability of an individual 
officer’s conduct, and if it would apply the exclusionary 
rule only where a Fourth Amendment violation was 
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,” then the “good 
faith” exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has recently directed a sustained legal assault 
against the exclusionary rule.2  First, in Hudson v. Michigan,3 the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 2. See id. at 2423–24 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when searches 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/2
2014] CONSTITUTIONAL CULPABILITY 625 
 
declared that the exclusionary rule never applies to Fourth Amendment 
knock-and-announce violations.4 Then, in United States v. Herring5 and 
Davis v. United States,6 the Court delivered more internally damaging 
doctrinal blows, developing a new theory of exclusion based on 
considerations of culpability.7 The exclusionary rule—once an 
automatic remedy for constitutional violations—now requires a separate 
and more searching analysis.8 Rights and remedies have been decoupled 
such that a clear Fourth Amendment violation may not lead to the 
exclusion of evidence.9 Instead, a clear Fourth Amendment violation 
now leads to an examination of the conduct of the law enforcement 
officer—conduct that does not require exclusion if it is not sufficiently 
“culpable.”10 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Herring: 
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be 
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully 
deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is 
                                                                                                                     
are conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent); Herring v. United 
States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009) (noting that suppression is not an automatic consequence of a 
Fourth Amendment violation); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (declaring that 
the suppression of evidence “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse” and that the 
Court has long since rejected the broad application of the exclusionary rule). 
 3. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599. 
 4. See id. at 592, 599. 
 5. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700–02 (discussing the underlying principles of the Court’s 
precedent that serve to constrain the application of the exclusionary rule). 
 6. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning that the majority’s 
approach threatens to erode the exclusionary rule). 
 7. David A. Moran, Hanging on by a Thread: The Exclusionary Rule (Or What’s Left of 
It) Lives for Another Day, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 363, 380 (2011) (“To use a trite metaphor, the 
exclusionary rule is on life support. Davis confirms that the Court will not overrule Mapp 
anytime soon, but it also confirms that a solid majority of the justices have devised a strategy 
that eliminates any need to formally abolish the exclusionary rule.”); see also Craig M. Bradley, 
Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2012) (“The post-
Herring decisions of the courts of appeals suggest that the exclusionary rule is not dead but has 
been significantly limited by Herring.”). 
 8. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[A]ll evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in 
a state court.”), with Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704 (“Petitioner’s claim that police negligence 
automatically triggers suppression cannot be squared with the principles underlying the 
exclusionary rule, as they have been explained in our cases. In light of our repeated holdings 
that the deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice 
system . . . .”). 
 9. Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 463, 463 (2011) (“Although the result in Herring v. United States surprised no one, the 
sweep of the Supreme Court’s opinion was breathtaking. . . . If accepted at face value . . . this 
and other declarations in the Court’s opinion would mark a revolution in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Together with the Court’s restriction of civil actions, they would leave most 
violations of the Fourth Amendment without a remedy.”). 
 10. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984)). 
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worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in 
our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.11 
Under this reasoning, in any suppression hearing a court must now 
examine the objective culpability of actors involved to determine the 
magnitude of the constitutional wrong.12 In other words, courts must 
now address the constitutional blame of the wrongful government actors 
before they exclude evidence recovered by those actors. 
This is new territory for lawyers and courts accustomed to an 
automatic linkage between constitutional wrongs and constitutional 
remedies.13 Does this new focus on deliberateness mean that the 
particular officer’s knowledge, intent, training, oversight, or past 
constitutional errors are now relevant to suppression?14 How can 
litigants prove or defend against systemic errors without extensive 
discovery, expert witnesses, and mini-hearings on training and best 
practices?15 Does this mean that the police officer and police 
department must defend or deny their personal and professional intent 
to violate a constitutional right in each suppression hearing?16 These 
questions open up unexplored territory for judges seeking to understand 
the Supreme Court’s new standard for exclusion and require lawyers to 
make new tactical choices in suppression hearings. 
This Article is written in the aftermath of what legal scholars have 
recognized as a significantly disfigured exclusionary remedy.17 The 
Hudson-Herring-Davis trilogy presents a new and largely unexamined 
doctrinal landscape for Fourth Amendment suppression hearings.18 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Id. at 702. 
 12. Id. at 701. 
 13. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13 (1995) (describing how the identification of a 
Fourth Amendment violation is no longer synonymous with the application of the exclusionary 
rule); cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 254 (1983) (“The exclusionary rule is a remedy adopted 
by this Court to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of citizens ‘to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .’ Although early 
opinions suggested that the Constitution required exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence, 
the exclusionary rule ‘has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.’” (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
482, 486 (1976))). 
 14. See infra Subsections III.B.2–4. 
 15. See infra Subsections III.B.6–7. 
 16. See infra Subsections III.B.2–3. 
 17. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 7, at 2; Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A 
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 757, 787 (2009); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling For Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal 
Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 727 (2011). 
 18. See infra Part II. 
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Courts, litigators, and scholars are only now assessing what has changed 
on the ground in trial practice.19 The next few years may well determine 
whether the exclusionary rule, as understood since Mapp v. Ohio, still 
exists, or whether it has been replaced by a much more narrow and 
restrictive rule.20 The contested lines for the exclusionary rule’s future 
have been drawn, but neither side has yet finalized the shape of the 
remedy—a picture that will be developed only through lower court 
litigation.  
This Article approaches the Roberts Court’s exclusionary rule 
reasoning on its own terms. It analyzes the doctrinal moves of a 
Supreme Court focused on culpability and raises questions about the 
evolving doctrine’s implication for trial practice. The Article then 
suggests several responses for lawyers and courts approaching this new 
reality. It argues that the Supreme Court failed to consider the practical 
consequences of its holdings, and this failure now opens new avenues 
for defense counsel to exploit an otherwise significant limitation of the 
exclusionary doctrine. In addition, the most recent exclusionary rule 
cases create new concerns for prosecutors who seek to rely on evidence 
tainted by constitutional error.  
This Article arises as part of a larger move toward “grounded 
scholarship,” a developing movement to make legal scholarship more 
relevant and useful for courts and practitioners.21 In response to growing 
criticism that the divide between the legal academy and legal practice 
has widened, this work seeks to translate constitutional theory into 
practical considerations useful for lawyers and courts.22 While much 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See supra note 17. 
 20. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); LaFave, supra note 17, at 787. 
 21. See 2013 AALS Midyear Meeting, ASS’N. AM. L. SCH. 1, 7 (last visited Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://aals.org/midyear2013/AALS_Midyear_2013.pdf (discussing a panel highlighting “The 
Competitive Advantage of Grounded Scholarship” to help bridge the gap between the work of 
scholars and practitioners). 
 22. Chief Justice John Roberts spoke about the disconnect between the legal profession 
and the legal academy in a speech to the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference in June 2011, 
stating: “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, . . . and the first article is likely to 
be . . . the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or 
something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much 
help to the bar.” Brent Newton, Scholar’s Highlight: Law Review Articles in the Eyes of the 
Justices, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/04/schol 
ar%E2%80%99s-highlight-law-review-articles-in-the-eyes-of-the-justices; see, e.g., Harry T. 
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992); Brent E. Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the 
Twenty-First-Century Supreme Court Justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399, 
399–400 (2012); Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ 
Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical Competencies 
Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105, 113–20 (2010). 
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legal scholarship is useful, relevant, and necessary for practice,23 the 
shift is in the intentionality of translating legal theory into practical trial 
strategies.  
Part I of this Article examines the recent exclusionary rule decisions 
of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts. Beginning with 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s broadside against the exclusionary rule in 
Hudson, and continuing with more restrained attacks in Herring and 
Davis, the Supreme Court has redefined the purpose and practice of 
exclusion.24 The Court has both decoupled the right from the remedy 
and altered the underlying logic of the rule. 
Part II questions the doctrinal consequences of this redefined 
exclusionary rule. The new culpability-focused standard of exclusion 
shifts the analysis to the investigating officer or police department.25 
Deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent wrongdoing by that officer or 
the police department will lead to suppression.26 Merely negligent 
constitutional wrongdoing, however, is no longer sufficient to exclude 
evidence.27 This determination of “constitutional culpability” will apply 
to hundreds of thousands of police arrests and prosecutions every year. 
In each suppression hearing, the court must now make a culpability 
determination, which considers the actions, knowledge, training, and 
intent of the participating officers.28 Part II also addresses the Court’s 
language and logic as well as its adoption of legal terminology from 
unrelated criminal and civil contexts. Criminal law regularly refers to 
culpability with the same language the Supreme Court chose in Davis 
and Herring. Deliberate, reckless, and grossly negligent (meaning 
criminally negligent) are well-established legal concepts.29 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to 
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 66–67 (2006) (discussing benefits of legal theory in relation to 
legal practice); Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the 
Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1016–17 (2012) (finding 
that the Court uses legal scholarship “rather a lot” despite claims by judges that legal 
scholarship is irrelevant to the bench); David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal 
Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 
1359–64 (2011) (noting that empirical data gathered over fifty-nine years suggest an upward 
trend in federal circuit court opinions citing legal scholarship, contradicting claims that there has 
been a decline in the use of legal scholarship by courts). 
 24. See infra Part I. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). 
 27. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011).  
 28. Part III describes what this hearing might look like.  
 29. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on Alexander’s 
Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 955, 956–59 (2000) (discussing 
the mens rea term “recklessness” and the different interpretations of the word in the criminal 
law culpability hierarchy); see also infra Section II.B (discussing the term in both the civil and 
criminal law context). 
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civil law also differentiates between deliberate, reckless, and grossly 
negligent behavior for tort liability.30 Adapting these existing culpability 
standards to the exclusionary rule may provide helpful guidance to 
courts addressing the issue. However, it will also alter the existing 
practice for exclusionary rule litigation, opening up new, previously 
forbidden avenues of inquiry in exclusionary rule determinations.  
Part III examines the practical, future application of the Supreme 
Court’s recent doctrinal shift. It begins by looking at the tactical choices 
defense counsel and prosecutors face when required to apply the 
Supreme Court’s recent rulings. From one perspective, much of the 
Court’s expansive language that limits exclusion is dicta, unnecessary to 
the holdings of the Court’s decisions. Defense lawyers can attempt to 
avoid the consequences of the Court’s reasoning by arguing for a 
limited interpretation of the cases. From another perspective, however, 
the landscape has dramatically changed. Defense lawyers have new 
avenues for cross-examination, expert testimony, legal argument, and 
remedies based on the unintended consequences of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions. Prosecutors, in turn, must defend against expanded discovery 
requests and arguments that address individual and department-wide 
culpability. These new avenues will place additional burdens on trial 
courts, essentially adding a second level of analysis to the typical 
suppression hearing. 
The Conclusion predicts how courts will adapt to this new 
exclusionary rule reality. While the Supreme Court did not appear to 
consider the new exclusionary rule’s effect at the trial level, this Article 
concludes that it will have a significant impact. 
I.  THE ROBERTS COURT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOCTRINE 
A new lawyer considering the exclusionary rule for the first time 
would read the recent majority opinions of the Supreme Court as 
holding two things: First, the exclusionary rule’s “sole purpose . . . is to 
deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”31 Second, the deterrent 
benefit of exclusion turns on the culpability of the officers or 
department, and only when police exhibit “deliberate, reckless, or 
grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights” does the 
deterrent value outweigh the costs.32  
                                                                                                                     
 30. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 483 
(1992) (defining gross negligence and explaining how the term is sometimes used 
interchangeably with recklessness in tort law); see also infra Section II.B (discussing the term’s 
varying levels of civil law culpability). 
 31. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426; accord Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 
(2009). 
 32. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Herring, 129 S. 
Ct. at 702. 
7
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Unencumbered by history or the doctrinal currents swirling around 
that language, the sweeping assertions of purpose and justification for 
the rule appear forceful, if not exactly clear.33 Yet, as is the case with 
most constitutional tensions, the language requires some unpacking. 
This Part describes the century-long trajectory of the exclusionary rule 
doctrine with a focus on the Court’s decisions under Chief Justice John 
Roberts. 
A.  A Brief History of the Modern Exclusionary Rule 
In its modern form, the exclusionary rule was first applied to federal 
Fourth Amendment violations in the 1914 case Weeks v. United 
States.34 In 1961, the Supreme Court applied the rule to state action 
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio.35 While some 
commentators have located exclusion as a remedy in cases from the 
Founding era,36 most jurists and scholars understand the exclusionary 
rule to be a judicially created response to unconstitutional action.37 For 
decades following Mapp, the Supreme Court approached the 
exclusionary rule as a necessary and constitutionally connected remedy 
for a constitutional wrong.38 Until Hudson v. Michigan, Supreme Court 
opinions assumed with little difficulty an intrinsic link between the 
exclusionary rule and unconstitutional action, without any separation of 
rights and remedies.39 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See generally George M. Dery, III, “This Bitter Pill”: The Supreme Court’s Distaste 
for the Exclusionary Rule in Davis v. United States Makes Evidence Suppression Impossible to 
Swallow, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 11–13, 19–27 (2012) (discussing the Davis Court’s 
extensive “attack” on the exclusionary rule as a judicially created exception, blurring the line 
between Fourth Amendment violations by police officers and the corresponding remedy for 
those charged); Derik T. Fettig, When “Good Faith” Makes Good Sense: Applying Leon’s 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule to the Government’s Reasonable Reliance on Title III 
Wiretap Orders, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 373, 375–84 (2012) (discussing the lack of clarity in the 
Court’s application of the exclusionary rule’s good faith exception in wiretap orders); Eugene R. 
Milhizer, Debunking Five Great Myths About the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 211 
MIL. L. REV. 211, 214–17 (2012) (discussing the imprecision of the exclusionary rule as it 
developed over time). 
 34. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961). 
 35. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 36. See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 
45 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2009). 
 37. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) (“The exclusionary rule operates as a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights through the rule’s general deterrent effect.”). 
 38. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 50–51 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 
335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); 
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.  
 39. See 547 U.S. 586, 613 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court has decided more 
than 300 Fourth Amendment cases since Weeks. The Court has found constitutional violations in 
8
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Conservative scholars and dissenting members of the judiciary did 
not allow this elevation of a particular remedy for a constitutional 
wrong to go unnoticed.40 Prominent voices such as Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo and Judge Fred Friendly criticized the exclusionary rule. They 
argued that the costs of exclusion far outweighed the benefits of 
constitutional enforcement.41 Government litigants worked to restrict 
the automatic application of the exclusionary remedy almost since its 
creation.42 Judges, critical of its use, have repeatedly echoed the concern 
that it makes little sense that “[t]he criminal [should] go free because 
the constable has blundered.”43  
Most notably, a series of exceptions to the application of the 
exclusionary rule developed. These exceptions include now familiar 
doctrines such as the “inevitable discovery exception,”44 the “good faith 
exception,”45 and the attenuation exception.46 In addition, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
nearly a third of them. . . . But in every case involving evidence seized during an illegal search 
of a home (federally since Weeks, nationally since Mapp), the Court . . . has either explicitly or 
implicitly upheld (or required) the suppression of the evidence at trial. In not one of those cases 
did the Court ‘questio[n], in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued 
application of the [exclusionary] rule to suppress evidence from the State’s case’ in a criminal 
trial.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 
(1978))); supra note 38. 
 40. See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 586–88 (N.Y. 1926); see also Henry J. Friendly, 
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 930, 949 (1965) 
(noting that the Court’s exclusion remedy is “only a remedy in aid of a right; no one would 
suggest that the police may engage in unbridled searches if they will dispense with use of the 
provable fruits”). 
 41. In Defore, Justice Cardozo insisted that the court should “not subject society to the[] 
dangers” of letting “[t]he criminal . . . go free because the constable has blundered.” 150 N.E. at 
587–88; see also Friendly, supra note 40, at 953 (“[A] slight and unintentional miscalculation 
by the police” should not result in a “dangerous criminal [going] free.”).  
 42. See Laurin, supra note 17, at 694 (“In 1981, Attorney General William French 
Smith’s Task Force on Violent Crime urged that the exclusionary rule be reformed to remove 
from its ambit ‘evidence . . . obtained by an officer acting in the reasonable, good faith belief 
that it was in conformity to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,’ and that this position be 
advanced by Department of Justice lawyers in future criminal litigation.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERALS TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL 
REPORT 55 (1981))); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra, (“We recommend that the Attorney General 
instruct United States Attorneys and the Solicitor General to urge this [good faith exception to 
the exclusionary] rule in appropriate court proceedings, or support federal legislation 
establishing this rule, or both.”); cf. Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly 
Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun’s Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing 
Judicial Understanding About Its Effects in the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 48–49 (1994) 
(describing a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court after Mapp that precluded the 
application of the exclusionary rule where exclusion would not deter Fourth Amendment 
violations). 
 43. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (quoting Defore, 150 N.E. at 587).  
 44. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (finding an exception to the 
exclusionary rule if the information would have been ultimately discovered by lawful means).  
 45. See United States. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (reasoning that a court should 
9
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Court exempted from exclusionary remedies certain categories of 
noncriminal cases involving civil tax proceedings,47 habeas corpus 
proceedings,48 and probation or parole violation hearings.49 While one 
could argue that these cases laid the groundwork for a broader limitation 
of the doctrine, most observers instead consider these decisions to be 
prudential responses, counteracting a perceived windfall for the criminal 
defendant.50 It is within this doctrinal framework that the Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice Roberts began its challenge to the continued 
use of the exclusionary rule.  
B.  Hudson-Herring-Davis 
This section discusses the Hudson-Herring-Davis trilogy, a series of 
cases that taken together sets out a new framework for the exclusionary 
rule doctrine.51 
1.  Hudson v. Michigan 
Hudson v. Michigan presented the simple issue of whether a 
conceded knock-and-announce violation should result in the exclusion 
                                                                                                                     
not suppress evidence when an officer reasonably relies on a warrant issued by a magistrate).  
 46. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (finding an exception to the 
exclusionary rule if the evidence obtained is so attenuated from the constitutional violation that 
the taint of that violation has dissipated); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 
(1975) (declining to overrule Wong Sun). 
 47. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447, 454 (1976) (declining to extend the 
exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings because the deterrent effect would be small). 
 48. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976) (“[T]he Constitution does not 
require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”). 
 49. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (holding that the 
“exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized 
in violation of parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights”). 
 50. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution 
Continues, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 381, 395 (2011) (“According to the Court, the exclusionary 
rule is designed to grant defendants an evidentiary ‘windfall’ for the limited purpose of deterring 
‘culpable’ law enforcement violations of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”). 
 51. See George M. Dery, III, Good Enough for Government Work: The Court’s 
Dangerous Decision in Herring v. United States, to Limit the Exclusionary Rule to Only the 
Most Culpable Police Behavior, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 27 (2009) (“Not only did 
Herring change the focus of analysis from identity of the wrongdoer to the level of government 
culpability, but it also lowered the standards that apply to the wrongdoing. With the spotlight on 
law enforcement rather than the judiciary, the Court no longer found careless mistakes to be a 
problem. In fact, the Court explicitly rejected the contention that ‘negligence automatically 
triggers suppression,’ ruling instead that when ‘police mistakes are the result of negligence such 
as described here,’ any ‘marginal deterrence’ from exclusion simply ‘does not ‘pay its way.’’” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) and United 
States. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 n.6 (1984))). 
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of evidence recovered.52 The facts were equally straightforward. Police 
obtained a valid warrant to search Booker Hudson’s house.53 Instead of 
waiting the appropriate amount of time after knocking and announcing, 
police entered the house and recovered narcotics and a firearm.54 
Hudson claimed that the evidence should be suppressed based on a clear 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.55 The Supreme Court, with Justice 
Scalia writing for the majority, disagreed.56 In a 5–4 decision, the Court 
held that as a categorical matter, exclusion is never the appropriate 
remedy for a knock-and-announce violation.57  
The facts and legal issue in Hudson were simple, but the Court’s 
reasoning was more complex. Justice Scalia dramatically reversed 
course on decades of exclusionary rule precedent and presented a new 
argument against exclusion. First, Justice Scalia reasoned that there was 
no “but-for” causal connection between the constitutional violation and 
the acquisition of evidence in this case.58 Here, the constitutional 
violation of failing to knock and announce was not the reason the 
evidence was recovered.59 The evidence was obtained pursuant to a 
valid search warrant.60 In other words, courts could sever the method of 
the search (which might have been a constitutional violation), from the 
justification for the search (which was constitutionally valid). 
As a secondary argument, Justice Scalia reasoned that even if one 
believed there was but-for causality in the case, the harm was attenuated 
from the constitutional violation.61 The Court thus crafted a new 
concept of attenuation—one that considers as its determining factor 
which interests are protected by the constitutional provision. 
“Attenuation also occurs when, even given a direct causal connection, 
the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been 
violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence 
obtained.”62 
In the knock-and-announce context, this meant looking at what 
interests the knock-and-announce doctrine protected. The Court 
identified three interests: “the protection of human life and limb,” “the 
protection of property,” and personal “privacy and dignity.”63 But the 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 594. 
 57. Id. at 587, 594. 
 58. Id. at 592. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 588. 
 61. Id. at 592–93. 
 62. Id. at 593. 
 63. Id. at 594. 
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Court argued that those interests were independent of, and thus not 
relevant to, the interests governing the seizure of evidence pursuant to a 
warrant.64 The Court has not further refined this novel attenuation 
argument based on “constitutional interests.”65 
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that even if there was but-for causality 
and even if the harm was not attenuated, courts must still conduct a 
cost–benefit analysis before they exclude evidence.66 Weighing the cost 
to the community of letting a criminal go free, the cost to the court 
system in terms of additional knock-and-announce cases, and the cost to 
police officers of adding to an already dangerous search situation, the 
Supreme Court had little difficulty finding the benefits of knocking and 
announcing to not outweigh the cost of exclusion.67 Concluding that 
there was almost no deterrence value in requiring exclusion for knock-
and-announce violations, Justice Scalia suggested relying on tort suits 
and police professionalism to replace the accountability function of the 
exclusionary rule.68  
The tenor and scope of the Hudson opinion was so wide ranging that 
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence to explain that 
the majority had not just killed the exclusionary rule.69   
The Court’s decision should not be interpreted as 
suggesting that violations of the requirement are trivial or 
beyond the law’s concern. Second, the continued operation 
of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our 
precedents, is not in doubt. Today’s decision determines 
only that in the specific context of the knock-and-announce 
requirement, a violation is not sufficiently related to the 
later discovery of evidence to justify suppression.70 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. (“What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected, however, is one’s 
interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. 
Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the 
evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”). 
 65. The Hudson Court’s new conception of attenuation was not central to the reasoning of 
Herring or Davis. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428–29 (2011) (holding that 
“[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent 
[that was later reversed] is not subject to the exclusionary rule” because applying the rule in that 
context would have no deterrent value); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146–47 (2009) 
(holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply where the defendant’s arrest resulted from an 
officer’s reasonable reliance on a police database error because the error was isolated, not 
systematic, so the marginal deterrent effect from applying rule would be outweighed by social 
costs). 
 66. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594–99. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 596–99. 
 69. Id. at 602–03 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/2
2014] CONSTITUTIONAL CULPABILITY 635 
 
As we will see, the specific context of knock-and-announce decisions 
did not end the dismantling of the exclusionary rule, but Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence has had a significant impact in moderating the 
Court’s approach.71 
2.  Herring v. United States 
In Herring v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
police clerical mistake that resulted in the unconstitutional arrest of the 
defendant warranted exclusion of the evidence found incident to that 
arrest.72 The facts of Herring present an interesting backstory to 
evaluate a discussion of police culpability. 
Bennie Herring, the defendant in the case, had complained to local 
prosecuting authorities that a particular police officer—Investigator 
Mark Anderson—should be investigated for the murder of a local 
teenager.73 Investigator Anderson, justifiably concerned about such an 
accusation, went to Herring’s home to discuss the matter with him.74 On 
the day in question, Investigator Anderson saw Herring near the local 
police station and sought reason to detain him.75 Investigator Anderson 
first called the local sheriff’s office to inquire if there were any 
outstanding arrest warrants for Herring.76 Finding none, Investigator 
Anderson asked the sheriff’s office clerk to check surrounding 
jurisdictions.77 The neighboring computer system identified that a 
warrant was active for Herring, and Investigator Anderson immediately 
arrested him.78 During a search incident to Herring’s arrest, Anderson 
recovered narcotics and a gun.79 Fifteen minutes later, the clerk 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The 
Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2005–2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 283, 308–09 
(suggesting that Hudson could portend the impending death of the exclusionary rule, but that 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hudson has left the rest of the divided Court uncertain of how 
he will vote if the Court grants certiorari on another case involving the exclusionary rule); David 
A. Moran, Waiting for the Other Shoe: Hudson and the Precarious State of Mapp, 93 IOWA L. 
REV. 1725, 1734–36 (2008) (describing how the uncertainty created by Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion in Hudson caused the Supreme Court “to lose its appetite” for Fourth 
Amendment cases and start to deny certiorari petitions challenging Mapp v. Ohio); James J. 
Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. 
REV. 1819, 1832–33, 1848–49, 1880–81 (2008) (recommending that lower courts apply Hudson 
cautiously because Justice Kennedy’s concurrence broke the tie and urged a narrow holding). 
 72. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009). 
 73. Id. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 74. Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.2, Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009) (No. 07-
513). 
 75. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. 
 76.  Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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discovered that, in fact, the warrant had been withdrawn and there was 
no active warrant for Herring’s arrest.80 However, by the time the error 
was relayed to Investigator Anderson, he had already arrested Herring 
and recovered the contraband.81 
As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals established, the arresting 
officers “were entirely innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness.”82 
Further, the court assumed that the police error of record-keeping was 
“a negligent failure to act, not a deliberate or tactical choice to act.”83 
The court refused to exclude the evidence because the error was only an 
isolated incidence of negligence and excluding the evidence would have 
little deterrent value.84 On that record, the Supreme Court, with Chief 
Justice Roberts writing for another 5–4 majority, reviewed the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule to police errors.85 
Chief Justice Roberts began the opinion by reframing the Court’s 
understanding of the exclusionary rule. He emphasized four points. 
First, he noted that the exclusionary rule is a “judicially created rule,” 
not a constitutional mandate.86 Second, he stated that exclusion should 
be considered the last resort for a remedy.87 Third, he stated that 
exclusion is not itself an individual right.88 And, fourth, he concluded 
that a finding of exclusion is only appropriate when it would deter 
future Fourth Amendment violations.89 This last point then requires a 
court to balance the costs and benefits of exclusion.90 
Under this interpretation, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule 
turns on the “flagrancy” of police misconduct.91 The more intentional 
the constitutional violation, the more likely exclusion will deter future 
acts.92 The less culpable the police misconduct, however, the less 
effective exclusion will be in deterring future violations.93 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 695 
(2009). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699–704. 
 86. Id. at 699. 
 87. Id. at 700. 
 88. Id.   
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 701. 
 92. See id. (“The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence 
principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct.” (emphasis added)). 
 93. See id. at 702 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently 
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence 
is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule 
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances 
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This new standard based on police culpability led the Court to 
determine that the evidence recovered from Herring need not be 
suppressed.94 The clerical error was negligent, apparently isolated, and 
quickly corrected.95 While the dissenting Justices offered different 
frames of analysis and different cost–benefit calculations, the 
controlling majority (including Justice Kennedy) held that a negligent, 
attenuated error did not require exclusion of evidence.96 
3.  Davis v. United States 
The most recent Supreme Court case on the exclusionary rule is 
Davis v. United States.97 Davis involved the question of whether 
evidence obtained by officers following binding appellate precedent 
should be excluded, if that precedent was later declared 
unconstitutional.98 In Davis, the officer had searched a car and 
recovered contraband in accordance with New York v. Belton, a 
controlling case that was later overturned by Arizona v. Gant.99 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that the police officer’s actions, although later 
declared unconstitutional, were at the time perfectly legal and quite 
reasonable.100 Thus, there was no deterrent value in suppressing 
evidence recovered from a then-lawful search.101 
Davis is notable because it wholeheartedly adopted the logic and 
spirit of Herring.102 Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority 
stated: “The [exclusionary] rule’s sole purpose, we have repeatedly 
held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”103 Justice Alito 
then cited United States v. Leon and Herring to emphasize the new 
focus on police culpability: 
When the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly 
negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the 
                                                                                                                     
recurring or systemic negligence.”). 
 94. Id. at 704. 
 95. Id. at 706 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 704 (majority opinion). 
 97. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 98. Id. at 2423. 
 99. Id. at 2425–26; see Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009) (holding that 
“Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the 
arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle”); New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of 
the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile”). 
 100. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2434. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., id. at 2427–29 (setting forth, and eventually applying, Herring’s police 
culpability analysis). 
 103. Id. at 2426. 
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deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh 
the resulting costs. But when police act with an objectively 
‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful, 
or when their conduct involves only simple, ‘isolated’ 
negligence, the ‘deterrence rationale loses much of its 
force’ . . . .104 
Because Davis involved a police officer’s reasonable reliance on 
binding appellate case law, there was no issue of culpability and no 
reason for exclusion.105 As the Court reasoned, the “acknowledged 
absence of police culpability doom[ed] Davis’[s] claim.”106 The 
question is what this doctrinal shift means in practice to the litigants and 
judges who must apply the Supreme Court’s terminology in suppression 
hearings. 
C.  A New Exclusionary Standard: Culpability-Centered 
The exclusionary rule under the Roberts Court now turns on an 
analysis of the culpability of the law enforcement agent or agency as a 
way of evaluating the deterrent value of exclusion. It is purportedly an 
objective test, as the Court has created the term “objectively culpable” 
to denote an analysis of objective wrongdoing that is based on an 
officer’s particular knowledge and experience, but not the officer’s 
purely subjective intent.107 
The focus on levels of culpability as the determining factor for 
exclusion rests on the Court’s belief that misconduct is deterrable only 
when the misconduct is committed in a deliberate, reckless, grossly 
negligent, or recurring manner.108 Thus, these are the only types of 
conduct that require the extreme remedy of exclusion.109 In other words, 
the exclusionary rule will not deter misconduct that is merely negligent 
or committed in good faith because the wrongdoer does not realize he 
has committed a wrong. 
While questions about the scope and meaning of culpability remain 
to be explored, the Court reaffirmed that the exclusionary remedy is 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Id. at 2427–28 (citations omitted) (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 
698, 702 (2009) and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909, 919 (1984)). 
 105. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423–24. 
 106. Id. at 2428.  
 107. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702–03. But see Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and 
Three-Dollar Steaks: The Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable 
Suspicion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 776 (2010) (“[T]he very notion of culpability seems to be 
a subjective one, and in fact the Court drew a distinction in Herring between a ‘negligen[t] or 
innocent mistake’ and one that is ‘deliberate’ or ‘knowing[],’ a distinction phrased explicitly in 
subjective terms.” (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 108. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.  
 109. Id. 
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inappropriate in several recurring circumstances in which a police 
officer relies in good faith on information from other sources. Thus, it is 
clear that a good-faith error in a warrant duly signed by a magistrate 
judge will not require exclusion.110 Similarly, a judicial clerk error or 
police administrative error does not require exclusion.111 Finally, good 
faith reliance on legislative decisions or current law does not require 
exclusion.112 
While these issues are settled by precedent, courts will likely have to 
determine whether the exclusionary rule applies when an individual 
officer makes a mistake based simply on his or her own misjudgment. 
In that situation, courts will likely find there was a constitutional 
violation. Under the traditional rules, this constitutional violation would 
trigger suppression. Under the new exclusionary rules, this violation 
will only trigger a second-step inquiry into the objective culpability of 
the police officer or police department. It is this new reality that litigants 
must consider as they face a culpability-centered exclusionary rule. 
II.  QUESTIONS ABOUT A CULPABILITY-CENTERED 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Several questions about language immediately arise from the 
Supreme Court’s new culpability-centered standard. First, what did the 
Court mean by the term objectively culpable and what factors can be 
considered by courts or established by litigants trying to argue this 
standard?113 Second, how should courts define “deliberate,” “reckless,” 
“grossly negligent,” and “recurring negligence”? These terms have a 
recognized meaning in civil law contexts such as constitutional tort 
cases, but it is unclear whether the Supreme Court meant to import these 
definitions to the exclusionary rule context.114 Criminal law scholars 
have also used these terms to distinguish levels of criminal culpability, 
but it is also unclear whether the Supreme Court meant to adopt those 
                                                                                                                     
 110. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917, 926 (holding the exclusionary rule should not apply when 
officers reasonably rely on a subsequently invalidated search warrant issued by a detached and 
neutral magistrate).  
 111. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1995) (holding that “[a]pplication of the Leon 
framework supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court 
employees” (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 916–22)); Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703 (holding that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply when the officers rely on an error in a police-operated warrant 
record system). 
 112. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355–57 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule is 
inapplicable when an officer reasonably relies on a statute subsequently deemed 
unconstitutional); see also Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (noting that the 
Court in Krull “extended the good-faith exception to searches conducted in reasonable reliance 
on subsequently invalidated statutes”). 
 113. See infra Section II.A. 
 114. See infra Section II.B. 
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criminal law definitions.115 In a few instances, the Roberts Court 
substituted “flagrant” for the term “deliberate” when it made analogies 
to the history of flagrant constitutional abuses in Weeks, Mapp, and 
Silverthorne.116 But the Court has offered no clarifying analogies 
concerning a recklessness standard or gross negligence standard.117 
Finally, in Hudson, the Court redefined the concept of attenuation to 
involve a consideration of the interests behind the constitutional right at 
issue—a previously unnecessary consideration.118 
The Court also remained silent about what information trial courts 
should examine to make these culpability-based determinations. In the 
civil context, recklessness and negligence presuppose an established 
standard of care that a particular action can be measured against.119 In 
the criminal context, gross negligence is regularly equated with criminal 
negligence.120 Further, recurrent negligence requires an understanding 
of systemic benchmarks against which to compare the particular 
conduct. While it is clear that the Hudson-Herring-Davis trilogy 
involves a new paradigm, it is not clear how to implement the Supreme 
Court’s new standard.121 The Court provides no framework from which 
to judge these familiar terms or standards, which leaves it to trial courts 
and litigants to choose the appropriate standard. This section questions 
the Supreme Court’s choice of language in creating a culpability-based 
exclusionary rule analysis. 
A.  Definitional Questions: Objectively Culpable 
In Herring, the majority coined the term objectively culpable, which, 
while taking into account the officer’s particular knowledge and 
experience, is to be evaluated against the “reasonable officer 
                                                                                                                     
 115. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal 
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 705 (1983). 
 116. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)). 
 117. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702–03. The Court suggested that police conduct that is 
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly neglient” is “sufficiently culpable” to trigger the exclusionary 
rule, yet the Court did not define those terms separately. Id. 
 118. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006). 
 119. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68 (2007) (“While ‘the term 
recklessness is not self-defining,’ the common law has generally understood it in the sphere of 
civil liability as conduct violating an objective standard: action entailing ‘an unjustifiably high 
risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” (quoting Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289, cmt. i (1965) 
(“The standard to which the actor must conform is that of the reasonably careful person under 
like circumstances . . . .”). 
 120. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “criminal negligence” as 
“[g]ross negligence so extreme that it is punishable as a crime”). 
 121. See Moran, supra note 7, at 378 (“Since the discussion of officer culpability in 
Herring and Davis was dicta, we do not really know what ‘gross negligence’ means.”). 
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standard”—namely “whether a reasonably well trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal.”122 The Court expressly rejected 
a “subjective intent” standard,123 but as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
pointed out in dissent: “It is not clear how the Court squares its focus on 
deliberate conduct with its recognition that application of the 
exclusionary rule does not require inquiry into the mental state of the 
police.”124 In addition, it is not clear how one is to measure the 
particular officer’s actions against the reasonable officer standard 
without such an individualized inquiry into the officer’s mental state.125 
Before Herring, the Supreme Court had never used the term 
objectively culpable to determine the extent of exclusion, and, in fact, 
had never used the term in any prior case for any reason.126 The 
meaning of “objectively culpable” is inherently puzzling. Culpability is 
a familiar term in criminal law.127 Most criminal laws are predicated on 
levels of wrongdoing, such that crimes and their punishment vary 
according to the individual blameworthiness of the offender.128 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009) (quoting United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123. See Alschuler, supra  note 9, at 485 (“Despite the Court’s declaration that its standard 
was objective, its opinion repeatedly used the term ‘good faith.’ The Court, however, 
accompanied its use of this apparently subjective term with an odd and oxymoronic modifier; it 
spoke of ‘objective good faith.’ Proof that a particular officer had acted in bad faith appeared to 
be irrelevant. The test was simply whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known 
that his search was unlawful.”); Laurin, supra note 17, at 727 (“On its face, the Court’s 
insistence that the standard it articulates be applied objectively seems nonsensical: Even if the 
lowest grade of culpability to trigger exclusion, gross negligence, could be assessed solely by 
reference to objective factors, proof of reckless or deliberate conduct typically requires a 
subjective inquiry.” (footnote omitted)). 
 124. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 710 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 125. See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 483 (“Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Herring sent 
objective and subjective pronouncements flying in all directions. Although the Supreme Court 
proclaimed unambiguously that its standard was objective, it also unambiguously invited courts 
to examine the mental states of police officers.”); Dery, supra note 33, at 26 (“The entire point 
of assessing a deliberate falsehood is to look inside an individual’s mind to see not only what he 
or she knew but also what he or she meant to make others believe. Such an inquiry outstrips the 
straightforward assessment of what a reasonable person would do in a particular situation. It 
leads to questions of intent and motivation of a particular person—an inquiry explicitly rejected 
by the Court in Whren.”). 
 126. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. Chief Justice Roberts’s use of the phrase is the only 
time these words have appeared in a Supreme Court case, prior or even since. The Court in 
Davis chose not to use the standard, so there is still no indication as to what the phrase means 
beyond how Chief Justice Roberts used it. 
 127. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, 
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 213–90 (8th ed. 2007); CHARLES E. 
TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 164–65 (15th ed. 1993) (“Reducing it to its simplest terms, 
a crime consists in the concurrence of prohibited conduct and culpable mental state.”).  
 128. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (“American criminal law has long 
considered a defendant’s intention—and therefore his moral guilt—to be critical to ‘the degree 
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Intuitively, it makes sense to consider the individual’s blameworthiness 
in determining whether a criminal sanction should be imposed. An act 
of homicide can be manslaughter or first-degree murder based on the 
subjective intent of the offender.129 Similarly, the act of taking property 
of another may be considered a theft (or no crime at all) depending upon 
the subjective intent of the actor.130 The objective act in each remains 
unchanged, but the societal condemnation changes based on the mental 
state of the actor. 
Civil standards, of course, purport to make this reasonable person-
like comparison, but “civil liability,” not “culpability,” is the preferred 
term.131 The Supreme Court has never used the term “civil culpability” 
because it begins to blur the already well-established lines for criminal 
blameworthiness and civil fault.132 While the Court may have intended 
to import the idea of civil tort liability from qualified immunity cases, 
the Court did not do so explicitly.133 
No doubt because of this linguistic confusion, Justice Alito, in 
adopting the spirit of Herring, altered the definition in Davis. Justice 
Alito reframed the test by stating that when “police act with an 
objectively ‘reasonable good faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful, or 
when their conduct involves only simple, ‘isolated’ negligence, the 
‘deterrence rationale loses much of its force,’ and exclusion cannot ‘pay 
its way.’”134 But, how would we know if an officer acted with the 
                                                                                                                     
of [his] criminal culpability’ . . . .” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 129. For example, the difference in homicide degrees is based on the subjective intent of 
the actor. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1–a (West, Westlaw through ch. 270 of 2013 
Reg. Sess.), with id. § 630:2. First degree murder requires that the person purposefully cause the 
death of another whereas manslaughter can be accomplished by recklessness. The difference in 
punishment is different, in that for first degree murder a person will receive a life sentence with 
no chance of parole. See, e.g., id. § 630:1–a. 
 130. If one takes a wallet from a table with the specific intent to permanently deprive the 
owner of their property, it is a crime. If one takes a wallet with the intent of returning it to the 
lawful owner, it is not a crime. The objective fact of taking the wallet is unchanged. What 
matters is the subjective reason for taking it. 
 131. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(distinguishing between criminal culpability and civil liability). 
 132. The term “civil culpability” has never been used in any Supreme Court case. Cf. 
Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 419 (2002) (discussing the 
distinction between civil liability and criminal culpability or blameworthiness). 
 133. See Laurin, supra note 17, at 672; see also Colin Starger, Response: Metaphor and 
Meaning in Trawling for Herring, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 109, 109–110 (2011); Robert L. 
Tsai & Nelson Tebbe, Notes on Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
140, 142–43 (2011). 
 134. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011) (citations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 n.6, 909, 919 (1984) and Herring v. United States, 129 
S. Ct. 695, 697 (2009)). The source for this new test is Herring and Leon, both cases that have 
nothing to do with the particular officer’s individual culpability. This test also runs against prior 
precedent that did not excuse good-faith errors from constitutional condemnation. Terry v. Ohio, 
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reasonable good faith belief that his or her conduct was 
constitutional?135 The question appears to require considering the 
officer’s knowledge of the law, his intent in applying the law, and the 
officer’s conduct compared to other reasonable officers who might 
apply the same law.136 While perhaps appropriate in a civil rights case 
against a police officer, this additional inquiry could now become part 
of everyday suppression hearings.137 Justice Alito’s explanation that 
“[r]esponsible law-enforcement officers will take care to learn ‘what is 
required of them’ under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform 
their conduct to these rules”138 only reinforces the idea that inquiry into 
individual and institutional training and rules may soon be required.139  
                                                                                                                     
392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (“And simple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not 
enough.’ . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 
(1964))). 
 135. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 807 A.2d 500, 516 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (“[A]ny ‘objective’ 
test implies the existence of a standard of conduct, and, where the standard is not defined by the 
generic—a reasonable person—but rather by the specific—a reasonable officer—it is more 
likely that [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702’s line between common and specialized knowledge 
has been crossed.” (alteration in original)). For example, in an excessive force case, “the 
question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 
 136. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. This is not a mere adoption of the Leon “good faith” 
test because there is no separate entity (a judicial officer) on which to rely. Instead, Justice Alito 
seemed to combine the Herring “objective culpability” language with Leon to apply to police 
officers. This is a wholly new construction of good faith and one that leaves many questions 
unanswered. 
 137. As Part III discusses, this new step raises a series of questions about how to define 
culpability. 
 138. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006)). 
 139. Part of the difficulty in applying the standard can be attributed to the Supreme Court’s 
manipulation of the idea of deterrence. Specifically, the Supreme Court made an 
unacknowledged shift from an exclusionary rule focused on general deterrence to an 
exclusionary rule also focused on specific deterrence. See Eugene Milhizer, The Exclusionary 
Rule Lottery Revisited, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 751 (2010). In both Herring and Davis, the 
Court looked to the actions of the particular law enforcement agents and asked whether 
exclusion would have an effect on their individual actions in the future. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
2427 (“The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion 
‘var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct’ at issue.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701)). This had not been the approach in earlier cases in which 
the courts eschewed a case-by-case approach to look at broad general deterrence principles. See 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (reasoning that the “purpose [of the 
exclusionary rule] is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it”).  
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B.  Definitional Questions: Mens Rea Terminology 
A related series of questions emerge if we take the new terms of 
culpability seriously. In both Herring and Davis, the Supreme Court 
relied on the language of deliberate, reckless, grossly negligent, and 
recurring or systemic negligence without providing definitions.140 As 
Professor Jennifer Laurin and others demonstrate, these terms find their 
roots in civil tort liability and qualified immunity cases involving 
unconstitutional actions of police officers.141 The “constitutional 
borrowing” of that legal terminology and application to the exclusionary 
rule has profound implications.142 As Professor Laurin argues, the 
Supreme Court has adopted a language and framework modeled on 
constitutional tort principles without acknowledging that it is doing 
so.143  
While these terms have a logical connection to civil tort liability, 
they also have meaning in criminal law. As an initial matter, courts will 
be faced with whether to judge these terms of culpability under a civil 
or criminal standard. Courts will likely follow the civil model, but an 
exploration of the different standards offers new insights about how 
courts may parse a complicated and inconsistently defined set of terms.  
1.  Deliberate 
Deliberate is a familiar term in civil law. Frequently used to describe 
intentional acts,144 or to modify a conscious failure to meet a duty (as in 
“deliberate indifference”),145 it is a common modifier for willful acts.146 
                                                                                                                     
 140. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2472–28 (quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702). In Davis, Justice 
Alito used the term “isolated negligence” as a definition of an action that did not require an 
exclusion sanction. Id. at 2438. 
 141. See Laurin, supra note 17, at 727; Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a 
Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687, 749–50 (2011) (“Herring’s version of the good faith 
exception threatens to import the ‘clearly established law’ requirement from habeas and 
qualified immunity cases into criminal cases.”). 
 142. See Laurin, supra note 17, at 739–42. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, 
Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010) (providing a thorough discussion 
of constitutional borrowing). 
 143. Laurin, supra note 17, at 727 (“Herring’s elevation of culpability as the ‘critical’ 
feature of the Court’s exclusionary rule inquiry squarely aligns the suppression remedy with the 
fault-based framework of constitutional torts—in contrast to the norm in criminal procedure 
remedies.”). 
 144. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 492 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “deliberate” as “[i]ntentional; 
premeditated; fully considered”). 
 145. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (addressing municipal liability 
under a failure-to-train theory and concluding that inadequate police training may only serve as 
the basis for § 1983 liability if the failure to train rises to the level of deliberate indifference to 
the rights of individuals). 
 146. As one example, in Ohio, deliberate is used as a nonmodifying prefix to intent, 
resulting in the seemingly redundant term of deliberate intent. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
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Intentional torts reference deliberate actions.147 Intentional violations of 
constitutional rights rest on deliberate conduct.148 Other times, the term 
deliberate serves to establish fault for other types of constitutional 
wrongdoing.149 While varying in the contexts in which it arises, 
deliberateness generally establishes a willful, intentional act.150 
                                                                                                                     
§ 2745.01 (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 59 of 130th Gen. Assemb.). When the Supreme 
Court of Ohio applied this paradigm to employment tort law, it held that a statutorily required 
finding of deliberate intent was met if a plaintiff could show the defendant acted with, “‘specific 
intent’ to cause an injury to another.” Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 983 
N.E.2d 1253, 1258 (Ohio 2012). In contrast, the New Jersey Superior Court has used deliberate 
as a meaningful adjective to describe the gravamen (in this case, the falsification of medical 
records) of a medical malpractice tort. The court held that “a deliberate falsification by a 
physician of his patient’s medical record, particularly when the reason therefor [sic] is to protect 
his own interests . . . must be regarded as gross malpractice.” In re Suspension or Revocation of 
the License of Jascalevich, 442 A.2d 635, 645 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (emphasis 
added). In contrast with the previous example, the New Jersey court’s use of deliberate appears 
to distinguish tortious deliberate falsification from (possibly) benign inadvertent falsification. 
 147. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical 
Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 93 n.94 (2003) (“Intentional torts are injuries 
committed with the purpose to bring about a desired result or a substantial certainty that a 
desired consequence will occur: ‘One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to 
liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not [privileged].’ 
Battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, 
trespass to land, and trespass to chattels are examples of intentional torts.” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979)). 
 148. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (noting that culpability 
evincing an intent to injure would “most probably support a substantive due process claim”); 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment is violated by 
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners”); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 
1152, 1154, 1162, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing summary judgment because a reasonable jury 
could find that a police officer may be liable under § 1983 after he deliberately ignored 
exonerating information that indicated he had arrested the wrong person); Whitley v. Seibel, 613 
F.2d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding that while negligent acts in an investigation do not 
violate due process, intentional acts may). 
 149. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1988) (holding that to make a 
successful due process violation claim against the state, a defendant must show that the state 
acted in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274–
75 (1980) (“This is not a case where, in Justice Cardozo’s words, ‘the 
constable . . . blundered,’ . . . rather, it is one where the ‘constable’ planned an impermissible 
interference with the right to the assistance of counsel.” (citations omitted)); Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 n.2 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Here, we have a Sixth 
Amendment case and also one in which the police deliberately took advantage of an inherently 
coercive setting in the absence of counsel, contrary to their express agreement.”); Massiah v. 
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (“We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic 
protections of [the Sixth Amendment] guarantee when there was used against him at his trial 
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from 
him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.”). 
 150. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 302 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 
54th Legis. 2013) (stating that an intentional tort “exist[s] only when the employee is injured as 
a result of willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer to cause such injury”); Nabozny v. 
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Deliberate action in a criminal law framework can best be equated 
with intentional, including purposeful and knowing, actions.151 In some 
criminal contexts, deliberate is more considered than intentional, as 
deliberate involves a weighing of choices and a decision.152 State 
criminal statutes emphasize the willful, intentional nature of the 
wrongdoing.153 The Model Penal Code term “purposely” similarly 
speaks to conscious intention154 or knowing action.155 While the 
language of state statutes differs, the general view is that a conviction 
based on deliberate actions requires proof of a subjective intent to 
commit the wrongful act. 
In terms of applying the deliberate standard to the exclusionary rule, 
a deliberate violation of a constitutional right would require purposeful, 
considered action to violate the Constitution.156 For example, a law 
                                                                                                                     
Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (“[A] player is liable for injury in a tort 
action if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, willful or with a reckless disregard for the 
safety of the other player so as to cause injury to that player . . . .”). 
 151. See, e.g., Deibler v. State, 776 A.2d 657, 662 (Md. 2001) (noting that “[t]he term 
willfully in criminal statutes has been said . . . to characterize an act done with deliberate 
intention for which there is no reasonable excuse” (alteration in original) (quoting Ewell v. 
State, 114 A.2d 66, 72 (Md. 1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 152. See, e.g., ROY MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 208 (1952) (“[A] ‘deliberate’ 
killing is a more opprobrious offense than an ‘intentional’ one since it is a weighed act.”); 12 
WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 392 (Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps eds., 2d ed. 
2005) (“When used to describe a crime, deliberate denotes that the perpetrator has weighed the 
motives for the conduct against its consequences and the criminal character of the conduct 
before deciding to act in such a manner. A deliberate person does not act rashly or suddenly but 
with a preconceived intention. Deliberate is synonymous with premeditated.”). 
 153. Many statutes include the language premeditated and deliberate as a requirement for 
first degree murder. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–13–202(a)(1) (2013) (providing that “[a] 
premeditated and intentional killing of another” constitutes first degree murder). 
 154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1962) (“A person acts purposely with respect to a 
material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a 
result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a 
result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence 
of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.” (emphasis added)). 
 155. Id. § 2.02(2)(b) (“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an 
offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that 
his conduct will cause such a result.” (emphasis added)). 
 156. Examples of deliberate violations of constitutional rights exist in Supreme Court case 
law. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (“[D]eliberate indifference is a 
stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or 
obvious consequence of his action . . . . to violate citizens’ constitutional rights . . . .” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997))) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); id. (“Policymakers’ ‘continued adherence to an approach that they 
know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the 
conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate indifference’—
necessary to trigger municipal liability.’” (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 407)); Missouri v. 
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enforcement officer would have to know the existing Fourth 
Amendment standard and then intentionally or purposely violate it. In 
the Terry stop context, the officer would need to know that he needed 
reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect, to know that he did not have 
reasonable suspicion, and to make the stop anyway.157 
Under both a civil and criminal deliberate standard, the analysis 
would largely be the same. Arguably, a police officer might 
intentionally (civil standard) stop someone without reasonable suspicion 
and without deliberating about it (criminal standard), but the willful 
nature of the act likely will be sufficient to justify exclusion under either 
standard.158 Both might fall into the category of flagrant conduct, which 
Chief Justice Roberts considered to provide the clearest justification for 
exclusion.159 Importantly, as Part III discusses, the officer’s intent 
would be fair game for cross-examination and argument under both the 
civil and criminal standards.  
                                                                                                                     
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The police used a two-step 
questioning technique based on a deliberate violation of Miranda.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (explaining that a prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” 
sufficient to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim if “the official acted or failed to act despite his 
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm”); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 
(1980) (“The question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent 
‘deliberately elicited’ incriminating statements . . . within the meaning of Massiah.”); Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (“[T]he Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more 
efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the State’s 
case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate.”); Massiah v. 
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding that the government violated the Sixth 
Amendment by using at trial incriminating statements that were deliberately elicited from the 
petitioner in the absence of counsel). 
 157. Or, in the interrogation context, an officer would have to interrogate an individual 
without Miranda warnings despite the officer’s knowing that Miranda warnings are required for 
custodial interrogation, and create a statement actually used against the defendant at trial. Of 
course, the constitutional violation would only occur if the government were trying to introduce 
the statement at trial. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004) (“[P]olice do not violate 
a suspect’s constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to 
provide the suspect with the full panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda. Potential 
violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at 
trial.”). 
 158. One potential wrinkle to adopting the criminal law definition is whether the 
accompanying defenses should come along with it. For example, in criminal law a reasonable 
and even unreasonable mistake of fact or law would negate the mens rea normally associated 
with specific intent crimes. As such, unless the officer admitted to the unconstitutional intent, 
there would be no real way to exclude evidence based on a deliberate violation. Any mistake 
would negative the intent, and thus, under an analogous criminal law framework, exonerate the 
officer from wrongdoing. 
 159. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701–02 (2009) (describing the flagrant 
nature of early exclusionary rule abuses). 
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2.  Reckless 
Recklessness in the civil law context is understood as an action that 
consciously ignores a potential harm.160 Courts define recklessness as 
acting with a conscious and unjustified awareness of the risks.161 This 
involves both objective considerations (e.g., the unreasonableness of the 
risk) and subjective considerations (e.g., the individual actor’s 
awareness or knowledge of the risks).162 As the Restatement of Torts 
summarizes: 
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of 
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act 
which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having 
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man 
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is 
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make 
his conduct negligent.163 
                                                                                                                     
 160. One must act with a conscious appreciation for the potential harm his or her action 
may cause, or reasonably should have appreciated the potential harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 500 (1965); see, e.g., Hickingbotham v. Burke, 662 A.2d 297, 301 (N.H. 1995) (“A 
social host’s service of alcohol would be reckless if the host ‘consciously disregard[ed] a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk’ of a high degree of danger. The risk that the host disregards 
must be ‘of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s 
conduct and the circumstances known to [the actor], its disregard involves a gross deviation 
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’” 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (6th ed. 
1990))). Note that the mens rea requirement of recklessness should not be confused with an 
intentional tort: a reckless actor does not intend to cause the resultant harm, he or she only 
intends to engage in the high-risk action and is cognizant of its potential harmful outcome. See 
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
199 (11th ed. 2005). 
 161. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68 (2007) (“While ‘the term recklessness 
is not self-defining,’ the common law has generally understood it in the sphere of civil liability 
as conduct violating an objective standard: action entailing ‘an unjustifiably high risk of harm 
that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 836 (1994))). Indiana case law defines recklessly as acting with a “plain, conscious, 
and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial 
deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Kimball v. State, 474 N.E.2d 982, 985 (Ind. 
1985). 
 162. Harry F. Tepker, Jr., The Arbitrary Path of Due Process, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 219 
n.145 (2000) (“Judicial definitions of ‘reckless conduct’ seem to follow similar, though not 
identical, patterns of assessing both objective factors—such as the degree or unreasonableness 
of risk—and subjective factors—such as awareness, knowledge, and intent.”). 
 163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). 
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Again, while the recklessness standard varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction (and cause to cause), it generally includes awareness of and 
a rejection of ordinary duties to avoid risk.164 
Recklessness has also been well studied by criminal law scholars and 
judges.165 State statutes define recklessness as acting with the awareness 
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that involves a gross deviation 
from what a reasonable person would do in the actor’s situation.166 The 
Model Penal Code also tracks this language.167 A key point is awareness 
of the type of risk (substantial and unjustified) and the choice to act in a 
                                                                                                                     
 164. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C) (LexisNexis 2013) (providing that 
recklessness is defined as “heedless indifference to the consequences, [by] perversely 
disregard[ing] a known risk that [one’s] conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to 
be of a certain nature”); Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632 F.3d 658, 665 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining 
that “[r]ecklessness is defined as conduct that is an extreme departure from the standards of 
ordinary care’” (quoting City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 
(7th Cir. 1977) (“[A] highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even 
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and 
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or 
is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.” (citation omitted)); see also BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (6th ed. 1990) (“recklessness” is defined as “[t]he state of mind 
accompanying an act, which either pays no regard to its probably or possibly injurious 
consequences, or which, though forseeing such consequences, persists in spite of such 
knowledge”). 
 165. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 29, at 959 (“In my view, what should justify a judgment 
of criminal recklessness is that the actor is aware that she is taking an unjustifiable risk or, at the 
very least, is aware that there is a significant likelihood that her intended conduct is 
unjustifiable. . . .”). 
 166. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 49 A.3d 1090, 1103 (Del. 2012) (“Awareness of, and 
conscious disregard for, a substantial, unjustifiable risk will suffice to constitute recklessness.”); 
State v. Sewell, 603 A.2d 21, 28 (N.J. 1992) (citing 2 THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION, commentary to § 2C:2-2, at 
41–42 (1971)) (noting that recklessness resembles knowledge in that both involve a state of 
awareness: the awareness in knowledge being ‘certainty’ of a result; that of ‘recklessness’ 
involving the conscious disregard of a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that a result will 
occur); State v. Ramsey, 1 A.3d 796, 800 n.5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“Reckless 
culpability is a lesser culpability to purposeful or knowing conduct.” (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:2–2(b)(1)–(3) (West 2013)); State v. Murphy, 447 A.2d 219, 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1982). 
 167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962) (“A person acts recklessly with respect to a 
material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”); see also Dannye 
Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures: 
A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. 
REV. 229, 229–30 (1997) (discussing the Model Penal Code’s redefinition of culpable mental 
states and influence on criminal law in more than half of all states). 
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way unlike a reasonable person (deviating from a reasonable standard of 
conduct). Another key point is that awareness of a risk must be 
considered in relation to the reasons for the risk. Thus, if there is a 
justified reason for the risk, the act may not, in fact, be reckless.168  
Civil recklessness and criminal recklessness involve different 
standards. As the Supreme Court explained, “Unlike civil recklessness, 
criminal recklessness . . . requires subjective knowledge on the part of 
the offender.”169 Thus, civil recklessness involves “conduct violating an 
objective standard: action entailing an unjustifiably high risk of harm 
that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.”170 Criminal 
recklessness builds on this objective “should have been aware” standard 
and requires actual, subjective awareness.171 Thus, choosing a criminal 
reckless definition would raise the bar on exclusion. It would also signal 
a shift away from the objective standards the Court seems to favor in the 
qualified immunity context.172 
In terms of applying this civil recklessness standard to the wrongful 
action of a police officer for purposes of exclusion, a court would have 
to first determine the objective standard of what a reasonable police 
officer would do.173 Then, a court would have to determine if the 
                                                                                                                     
 168. According to Professor Joshua Dressler, the awareness of the risk is judged in 
comparison to the reasons for taking the risk. See JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 154 (3d ed. 2003) (“The risk of which the actor is aware must of 
course be substantial in order for the recklessness judgment to be made. The risk must also be 
unjustifiable. Even substantial risks, it is clear, may be created without recklessness when the 
actor is seeking to serve a proper purpose . . . .”). 
 169. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68 n.18 (2007). 
 170. Id. at 68 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 171. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37 (clarifying that criminal law permits a finding of 
recklessness only when the defendant possesses an actual, subjective awareness of the risk of 
harm). 
 172. In general, constitutional tort liability and its companion doctrine, qualified immunity, 
turn on objective considerations. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987); Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has been clear that any subjective 
intent of the officer’s conduct is not relevant even if questions of the officer’s knowledge and 
experience are relevant. See id. at 815–18 (concluding that the Court will not consider evidence 
of subjective intent in cases where government officials rely on qualified immunity as an 
affirmative defense and that the Court will only consider whether an official’s conduct 
“violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known”). 
 173. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20 (1984) (“[W]here the officer’s 
conduct is objectively reasonable, excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the 
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . the officer is acting 
as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances.” (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539–40 (1976) (White, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Kladis v. Brezek, 823 F.2d 1014, 
1019 (7th Cir. 1987) (using the reasonable officer standard to determine if a police officer used 
excessive force); Patrick v. Moorman, 855 F. Supp. 2d 392, 402 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (explaining 
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officer’s actions unjustifiably risked harm that he or she should have 
known could occur.174  
For the criminal recklessness standard to apply, a police officer 
would have to be aware of a suspect’s constitutional rights and to act in 
a way that substantially and unjustifiably risked violating those rights. 
In the Terry context, the officer, knowing that he needed reasonable 
suspicion, would nevertheless act without reasonable suspicion and in a 
way that substantially and unjustifiably risked violating the Fourth 
Amendment. However, since this risk must be judged in comparison to 
the reasons for taking the risk, the officer might be able to minimize the 
unjustified nature of his or her actions by pointing to the importance of 
stopping potential criminal activity.175 This balancing might offer courts 
real flexibility in avoiding a finding of recklessness. 
Under either a civil or criminal standard, the questions for 
suppression hearings are new and expansive. In suppression hearings 
courts have purposely avoided inquiries into objective standards of care, 
awareness of those standards, and deviations from them.176 All of this 
                                                                                                                     
how a reasonable officer would determine if a suspect posed a threat to those around him); 
White v. State, 19 A.3d 369, 372 (Md. 2011) (discussing the reasonable police officer standard 
as explained by an expert witness). In excessive force cases, the reasonableness of force must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386, 396 (1989). 
 174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). The “objective” comparison 
might not open questions into the particular officer’s awareness of the constitutional rights or 
justification for acting. In suppression hearings, however, establishing a reasonable officer 
standard will burden the court because the court will have to establish the reasonable officer 
benchmark and then compare the particular officer’s awareness and actions to that benchmark 
standard. 
 175. See Hannah B. Schieber, Comment, Utter Confusion: Why “Utter Disregard for 
Human Life” Should Be Replaced with an Objective Analysis of the Defendant’s Activity, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 691, 698 (“Scholars often conceptualize criminal recklessness as requiring two 
states of mind: the ‘belief-state,’ referring to the defendant’s awareness of the risk, and the 
‘desire-state,’ referring to the defendant’s reasons for taking the risk. The desire-state does not 
indicate a desire to cause harm, but instead either an insufficient aversion to harm or a readiness 
to create a risk of harm. Determinations of recklessness become what Professor Joshua Dressler 
refers to as a ‘criminal law version of the Learned Hand formula.’ The fact finder considers the 
level of risk of harm the defendant created in light of the likelihood of that harm occurring, then 
weighs that against the defendant’s apparent reasons for engaging in the behavior. If a defendant 
knew that his actions created a significant risk but had legitimate reasons for creating those risks 
(such as speeding down a highway to rush someone to the hospital), a jury may not find his 
actions to be criminally reckless.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 176. Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 
80–81 (2007) (“In Whren v. United States, however, the Court unanimously rejected the 
defendants’ proposed ‘reasonable police officer’ standard—i.e., that ‘the Fourth Amendment 
test for traffic stops should be . . . whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made 
the stop for the reason given’—and held instead that a traffic stop is reasonable for 
constitutional purposes so long as it was based on probable cause. In so doing, the Court spoke 
disparagingly about the whole notion of objective standards, referring to them as ‘exercise[s]’ in 
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may change as courts wrestle with the difficult culpability terms that 
they may now be required to apply to any suppression determination. 
3.  Gross Negligence/Criminal Negligence 
The most interesting, most difficult, and most far-reaching standard 
of culpability mentioned by the Supreme Court is gross negligence. As 
a general matter, most constitutional violations would be better 
characterized as negligent (gross or ordinary) rather than deliberate or 
reckless, and thus understanding the floor set by this standard is 
important.177 
Ordinary civil negligence is differentiated from civil gross 
negligence by the magnitude of the deviation from a reasonable 
standard of care.178 In a civil case, one must claim a failure to live up to 
the standard of reasonable care.179 While ordinary negligence has 
different definitions, in general, it involves a failure to exercise 
reasonable care.180 Civil gross negligence, by contrast, involves a gross 
deviation from the standard of reasonable care.181 “Gross negligence has 
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as ‘meaning a 
                                                                                                                     
‘virtual subjectivity’ that call for ‘speculati[on] about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical 
constable.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 
(1996)). 
 177. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657–58 (1992) (finding government 
negligence as a justification to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds); Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily 
assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct . . . .”). 
 178. See, e.g., Altman v. Aronson, 121 N.E. 505, 506 (Mass. 1919) (“Gross negligence is 
substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence.”); Burk Royalty 
Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex. 1981) (noting the distinction in severity between 
ordinary negligence and gross negligence). 
 179. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (9th ed. 2009) (defining negligence as “[t]he failure 
to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a 
similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others 
against unreasonable risk of harm”).  
 180. For example, Delaware tort law defines negligence as “the want of due care or want of 
such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would exercise under similar 
circumstances.” Orsini v. K-Mart Corp., No. 95C-07-146-WTQ, 1997 WL 528034, at *3 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1997) (citing Kane v. Reed, 101 A.2d 800, 801 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954)); see also cf. 
Lee v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone LLP, 601 F.3d 654, 659 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Ohio tort law 
defines negligence as the failure to conduct oneself as would ‘a reasonably prudent man in like 
circumstances;’ and excludes from the definition of negligence ‘failing to take extraordinary 
measures which hindsight demonstrates would have been helpful.’” (quoting Bender v. First 
Church of Nazarene, 571 N.E.2d 475, 477 (1989))).  
 181. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 212 (W. 
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (explaining gross negligence “as failure to exercise even that 
care which a careless person would use” and noting that several courts “have construed gross 
negligence as requiring willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct . . . . But it is still true that most 
courts consider that ‘gross negligence’ falls short of a reckless disregard of the consequences, 
and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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greater want of care than is implied by the term ordinary 
negligence.’”182 As one court described, gross negligence is defined as 
“fail[ing] to observe even slight care” and “carelessness or recklessness 
to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that may 
result.”183 
Similarly, criminal negligence involves failing to perceive as 
substantial and unjustifiable that risk will result from one’s actions.184 A 
California court’s description in a homicide case of criminal negligence 
serves as a colorful example: 
[T]here must be a higher degree of negligence than is 
required to establish negligent default on a mere civil issue. 
The negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or 
reckless, that is, the conduct of the accused must be such a 
departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily 
prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances 
as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life, 
or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an 
indifference to the consequences.185 
The Model Penal Code offers a more restrained and influential 
definition that emphasizes that the individual should be aware of the 
substantial and unjustifiable risk, and that a failure to see this risk 
                                                                                                                     
 182. Blaine LeCesne, Crude Decisions: Re-examining Degrees of Negligence in the 
Context of the BP Oil Spill, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 103, 129 (quoting Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 495 (1875)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 183. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n v. Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 129 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted) (quoting Atkins Wright & Miles v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985)). 
 184. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4) (McKinney 2013) (“A person acts with criminal 
negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an 
offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur 
or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the situation.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(10) (2011) (defining criminal negligence 
as when “a person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will 
occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure 
to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person 
would observe in the situation”). 
 185. People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926, 937 (Cal. 1955) (quoting 26 AM. JUR. Homicide § 210 
(1940). The California jury instructions further explain “[c]riminal negligence involves more 
than ordinary carelessness, inattention or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal 
negligence when: 1. He or she acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from the way an 
ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation; 2. The person’s acts amount to 
disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of his or her acts; [and] 3. A 
reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would naturally and probably result 
in harm to others.” JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS no. 821, at 
538 (2013). 
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involves a gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable 
person.186 Other states have similar language.187 Criminal negligence, 
like civil negligence, is also an objective standard.188 As Professor 
Joshua Dressler states, “‘[N]egligence’ constitutes objective fault, i.e., 
an actor is not blamed for a wrongful state of mind, but instead is 
punished for his failure to live up to the standards of the fictional 
‘reasonable person.’”189 The difference between civil gross negligence 
and criminal gross negligence (otherwise known as criminal negligence) 
is complicated by the fact that no universal definition of civil gross 
negligence exists.190  
                                                                                                                     
 186. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (1962) (“A person acts negligently with respect to a 
material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his 
conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”). 
 187. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(4) (2013) (“[A] person acts with ‘criminal 
negligence’ with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining 
an offense when the person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result 
will occur or that the circumstance exists; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would observe in the situation.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:12 (2013) (“Criminal 
negligence exists when, although neither specific nor general criminal intent is present, there is 
such disregard of the interest of others that the offender’s conduct amounts to a gross deviation 
below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like 
circumstances.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(10) (2011) (“‘Criminal negligence’ or ‘criminally 
negligent,’ when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute 
defining an offense, means that a person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and 
degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b)(4) 
(West 2013) (“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when 
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will 
result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to 
perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and the circumstances known to 
him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the actor’s situation.”). 
 188. John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 111, 123 n.73 (1996) (“The Model Penal Code terminology, for example, defines 
negligence in objective terms, as contrasted with recklessness where subjective awareness is 
required.”). 
 189. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10:04(D)(2), at 131 (5th ed. 
2009). 
 190. LeCesne, supra note 182, at 129 (“Presently, and notwithstanding its ubiquitous 
statutory usage, there is no generally accepted meaning of ‘gross negligence.’”); see also id. 
(“One court even dubbed the task of assigning this higher level of culpability as akin to entering 
a legal ‘twilight zone which exists somewhere between ordinary negligence and intentional 
injury.’” (quoting Pleasant v. Johnson, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. 1985))); id. (“One of the most 
widely accepted modern expressions of gross negligence suggests that it consists of two 
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Applying a gross negligence standard in the exclusionary rule setting 
presents several problems. First, courts must agree on a definition. 
Second, a court would have to ask whether the officer’s actions 
involved a substantial and unjustified risk of violating constitutional 
rights. Third, the culpability determination would have to inquire into 
whether the officer’s failure to perceive the risk justifies condemnation. 
This inquiry would necessarily consider the surrounding circumstances 
of why the officer failed to perceive the risk of harm to constitutional 
rights. Thus, in the gross negligence area, courts would have to focus 
more on why the officer failed to perceive the risk of unconstitutional 
action rather than on the officer’s subjective thinking. 
As a final point, one might ask how to evaluate Justice Alito’s 
conception of “isolated negligence.”191 Why should an isolated mistake 
not deserve some sanction? Again, there may be a difference in 
interpretation between isolated civil negligence and isolated criminal 
negligence, as it affects the level of culpability,192 but in reality both 
isolated civil and criminal negligence are subject to legal liability. A 
good faith failure to meet the standard of care is still a failure to meet 
the standard of care. A negligent crime is still a crime. Interestingly, in 
early decisions the Court appeared to recognize that mere negligence 
could trigger the exclusionary rule.193 
While legal commentators generally understand that the Court 
appeared to borrow the civil tort standards (as opposed to criminal mens 
rea standards) to guide the new exclusionary rule,194 the Court did not 
                                                                                                                     
components: (1) the view from the objective standpoint of the actor and (2) the actual, 
subjective awareness of the risk involved and indifference to the welfare of others.”); see also, 
e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(11) (West 2003) (“Gross negligence means 
an act or omission . . . [that] when viewed objectively from the standpoint of the actor at the 
time of its occurrence involves an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and 
magnitude of the potential harm to others . . . of which the actor has actual, subjective awareness 
of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, 
or welfare of others.”). 
 191. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011).  
 192. See supra Subsection II.A.3. The Court also muddied the idea of the good faith 
exception. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 962 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); see also Dery, supra note 33, at 19–26 (arguing that Davis’s narrow 
focus on police culpability could cause the good faith exception to swallow the exclusionary 
rule). For cases in which the police relied in good faith on their own police error, see Herring v. 
United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702–03 (2009); Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (“Police practices 
trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield 
‘meaningfu[l]’ deterrence, and culpable enough to be ‘worth the price paid by the justice 
system.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702)). 
 193. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (“The deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least 
negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.”).  
 194. See, e.g., Laurin, supra note 17, at 671–73. 
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do so explicitly, and trial courts will be left to interpret these terms with 
conflicting meanings. Though lower courts might vary in their 
terminology and analytical framework, they will all have to incorporate 
this culpability question into their suppression hearings. This is new and 
uncharted territory and is the subject of Part III.  
C.  Definitional Questions: Attenuation 
In Hudson, the Supreme Court gave new meaning to another legal 
concept—attenuation. By doing so, the Court detached the concept of 
attenuation from its origins in Brown v. Illinois and Wong Sun v. United 
States.195 Prior to Hudson, certain constitutional violations did not result 
in automatic exclusion if the constitutional wrong was attenuated from 
the taint of the violation.196 For example, in Brown, the Court 
considered several factors that might lead to attenuation.197 
Considerations such as the temporal proximity between the illegal act 
and acquisition of evidence, any intervening acts, and the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct all could factor into an attenuation 
analysis.198 The key question was “whether, granting establishment of 
the primary illegality, the evidence . . . has been come at by exploitation 
of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint.”199 If there was sufficient attenuation, then 
the evidence did not need to be suppressed.200 
The attenuation doctrine in Hudson recalibrated this understanding. 
Justice Scalia reasoned that exclusion must serve the interests protected 
by the knock-and-announce rule.201 Decoupling the remedy from the 
right and now requiring an inquiry into the purpose of the constitutional 
protection adds new complexity to any exclusionary analysis.202 Taking 
                                                                                                                     
 195. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600–
05 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963). 
 196. Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses 
an Axe to Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L.J. 1183, 1218 (2012) 
(“During the 1960s and 1970s, attenuation analysis probed the strength of the connection 
between the police illegality and the evidence the prosecutor wished to introduce by examining 
the circumstances under which the evidence came into the hands of the police.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 197. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 599 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487–88 (1963)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 200. See id. at 598–600. 
 201. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593–94 (2006) (noting that “[a]ttenuation also 
occurs when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected by the constitutional 
guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained”). 
 202. Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age of Hudson v. Michigan: Some 
Thoughts on “Suppression as a Last Resort,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1060 (2008) (“Prior 
to Hudson, the attenuation doctrine had always probed the strength of the connection between 
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Justice Scalia’s terminology as written, courts must now examine the 
interests of the constitutional protections underlying constitutional 
rights.203 
As but one example, in a typical Fourth Amendment stop and frisk, 
what are the interests being protected by the constitutional limits placed 
on a police officer’s seizing an individual? Dignity?204 Privacy?205 
Security?206 The right to be left alone?207 How are those interests 
                                                                                                                     
the police illegality and the evidence the prosecutor wished to introduce by examining the 
circumstances under which the evidence came into the hands of the police. Thus, under the 
attenuation doctrine, the Court has sometimes found suppression unnecessary where the causal 
chain between a wrongful police act and the discovery of evidence had effectively been severed 
by some significant intervening event, or the police illegality was so far removed from the 
evidence it ultimately obtained, such as to question the deterrent value achieved by the 
suppression of the evidence. The inquiry was into whether the evidence in question had ‘been 
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint.’” (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592)); see also Tomkovicz, supra 
note 71, at 1862–71 (discussing Hudson’s novel and potentially broad application of the existing 
attenuation precedent). 
 203. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593–94; see Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and 
Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1741, 1761–64 (2008) 
(discussing which interests the knock-and-announce requirement serves as examined in 
Hudson); George M. Dery, III, A False Mirror: Hudson v. Michigan’s Distortion of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Knock-and-Announce Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 67, 89 (2007) 
(discussing constitutional interests in relation to attenuation and the need for a relationship 
between the penalty of exclusion and a violation of the knock-and-announce rule). 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 730 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) 
(noting that the abusive stop-and-frisk tactic risked eroding individual liberty and dignity); John 
D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655, 660–61 
(noting that while underdeveloped in case law and scholarship, the concept of dignity “has 
always existed around the periphery of constitutional search-and-seizure jurisprudence”); 
Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249, 1276–
77 (2012) (“The history of the Fourth Amendment amply supports the notion that it protects 
against the humiliation and loss of dignity wrought by unreasonable government searches and 
seizures.”).  
 205. See, e.g., United States v. Coates, 495 F.2d 160, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting stop and 
frisks are constitutional as long as they are reasonable based on a balancing test between 
government interests and an individual’s interest in privacy); Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? 
Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 119, 120–26 (2002) (discussing “privacy” in the context of Fourth Amendment search 
jurisprudence); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: 
Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 129, 152 (2002) 
(“Privacy is, however, more a matter of affect than cognition. Privacy is a set of metaphorical 
boundaries that enables each of us to safeguard a sense of self. Privacy enables us to decide 
which aspects of ourselves to reveal and to whom. That control matters deeply, because overly 
selective exposure of ourselves to others will lead to their misjudging our nature.”). 
 206. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (noting that in the context of stop and frisks, 
the question “is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, [the 
petitioner’s] right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure” 
(emphasis added)); see also Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: 
Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 351–66 (1998) (discussing the 
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balanced with stopping crime? Solving crime? Ensuring social order? A 
brief review of the scholarly literature on police–citizen Fourth 
Amendment encounters illustrates the problems with judging the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.208 
The exclusionary remedy, of course, applies not just to police–
citizen street encounters but to all types of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment violations, as well as various due process issues.209 To 
determine if exclusion would serve the purposes of the constitutional 
right, the purpose behind each right would have to be evaluated, 
debated, and decided. As Part III discusses, this language leaves many 
difficult questions for lawyers litigating these issues. 
D.  Application Questions: Constitutional Culpability 
Two significant questions remain about how to apply the Supreme 
Court’s new exclusionary rule. The first concerns the future Herring–
Davis question: whether the Supreme Court will be willing to extend its 
new exclusionary reasoning to nonculpable police officers who make an 
error of constitutional magnitude.210 The simplest and most common 
                                                                                                                     
Framers’ understanding of security in relation to the Fourth Amendment and its modern day 
conception). But see Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) 
(“The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee a right of privacy. It guarantees—if its actual 
words mean anything—a right of security.”). 
 207. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“[The drafters of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect 
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, 
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 208. Scholars argue that a host of values, such as dignity, respect, trust, security, power, 
and social control, are the true purpose of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray 
Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological 
Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) (“The Fourth Amendment protects power not 
privacy.”); Jeremy M. Miller, Dignity as a New Framework, Replacing the Right to Privacy, 30 
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“The eternal right, beyond technology and corrupt 
government, corporation, or individual, is dignity.”); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth 
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1751, 1775 (1994) (“Developments such as growing government regulation, and expanding 
technological capacity, however, have robbed the ‘right to be let alone’ of much of its power to 
control the legal discourse concerning the Fourth Amendment.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect 
and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23 (2003) (“The Fourth 
Amendment protects core interests essential to human flourishing, interests in privacy, property, 
and freedom of movement.”). 
 209. See William A. Davis, The Impeachment Amendment Exception to the Sixth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 176, 180–83 (1987) (discussing the 
exclusionary rule’s permeation throughout Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment as well as 
Miranda jurisprudence). 
 210. To be clear, this is the next logical step from Herring. Instead of a police employee, 
the police officer himself or herself makes the mistake. Thus, there is no separation from 
wrongdoing and no good faith reliance on another entity. 
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example would be if a police officer erroneously believes he has 
reasonable suspicion to seize or probable cause to search. There is a 
constitutional wrong, and the question would be whether the remedy of 
exclusion is available for this (intentional, reckless, grossly negligent, or 
negligent) mistake. Extending the Herring–Davis logic, the lack of 
culpability could mean that there would be no automatic exclusion.211 
The result potentially would necessitate a two-tiered suppression 
hearing in which courts are called upon to judge both the constitutional 
violation and the appropriate exclusionary remedy.212 
How this two-tiered suppression hearing would work is not yet 
known. As the next Part discusses, the questions that need to be 
answered to determine culpability and exclusion are not the same as 
those needed to determine whether a constitutional violation existed in 
the first instance.213 To evaluate culpability, should a court hold a 
separate hearing or allow cross-examination and evidence during the 
actual suppression hearing? Can the two steps happen simultaneously? 
What rules of evidence, discovery, or expert testimony should govern? 
These are questions courts will have to address before hearing evidence 
on even the most basic suppression hearing. 
The second question is the “Hudson question,” which asks whether 
Justice Scalia meant what he said—that the constitutional wrong must 
not be attenuated from the underlying constitutional interests.214 While 
such a distinction perhaps makes sense in the knock-and-announce 
context, it is much more difficult to determine the underlying 
constitutional interests in a stop-and-frisk case or for a search without 
probable cause. Or, under the Fifth Amendment, is the purpose of 
Miranda education, notice, fairness, protection, coercion, autonomy, or 
something else?215 While this language has dropped out of the analysis 
in the post-Hudson, Herring, and Davis cases, it remains a potential 
argument to further complicate the application of the exclusionary rule. 
                                                                                                                     
 211. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009); Davis v. United States, 131 
S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011). 
 212. Craig M. Bradley, Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 73 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 231 (2010) (“Now the Court is proposing to engage in a two-part 
inquiry in every case, considering first whether there was a breach and second whether the level 
of police culpability was reckless or systematic.”). 
 213. See infra Part III. The constitutional violation can be determined without delving into 
the officer’s intent or an objective culpability determination. In fact, Whren holds that the 
subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant to determine the constitutional violation. See infra 
notes 269–70 and accompanying text. 
 214. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592–93 (2006). 
 215. See Sharon L. Davies, Some Reflections on the Implications of Hudson v. Michigan 
for the Law of Confessions, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1207, 1233–34 (2007) (discussing how 
Hudson may have opened the door for “Miranda-defective statements” to avoid automatic 
suppression). 
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As the next Part discusses, the Roberts Court’s new standard opens 
up novel arguments for litigants and challenges for courts. Several 
unexamined and perhaps unintended effects will result as the language 
and logic of the opinions are litigated. 
III.  NEW STANDARDS FOR EXCLUSION:  
NEW LITIGATION QUESTIONS 
Because of the uncertain doctrinal framework, this new standard for 
exclusion presents emerging challenges for lawyers. The goal of this 
Part is to translate legal theory into practical considerations useful to 
those litigating Fourth Amendment issues.  
This Part focuses on the future Herring–Davis question not yet 
answered by the Supreme Court.216 The open question is what happens 
if the police officers themselves make a constitutional mistake.217 Can a 
court deny the exclusionary remedy because the mistake was isolated, 
negligent, in good faith, or not “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systematic 
negligence”?218 The answer will determine whether the exclusionary 
rule has any life left. 
A.  Strategic Denial: Concerning Dicta in Herring and Davis 
For defense lawyers facing the new exclusionary rule, the first 
option is to ignore Herring and Davis. The tactic of strategic denial 
exists because the Court’s language, although forceful, was unnecessary 
to the holdings in Herring and Davis. Thus, the first question is whether 
to accept the Court’s new standard as dicta.219 
Lawyers who choose the “denial approach” will argue for the 
narrowest interpretation of the Court’s holdings and reject outright the 
strong language limiting the exclusionary remedy.220 As a matter of 
blackletter law, the denial approach is supportable.221 Dicta, which is 
                                                                                                                     
 216.  The concern is not on cases with facts similar to Herring or Davis, which involved 
bureaucratic negligence or reliance on appellate holdings, as precedent now controls those cases. 
 217. See Marceau, supra note 142, at 742–54 (discussing mistake of law and mistake of 
fact by police officers after Herring). 
 218. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009). 
 219. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “dictum” as “[a] statement of 
opinion or belief considered authoritative because of the dignity of the person making it”).  
 220. Moran, supra note 7, at 376 (“Chief Justice Roberts used his Herring majority opinion 
in an attempt to engraft a brand new, officer-culpability requirement onto the exclusionary rule. 
Only deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct by individual officers would require 
exclusion; mere ordinary negligence would not. Never mind that this discussion was dicta since 
the line between ordinary negligence and gross negligence was not at issue in Herring, and 
never mind that the opinion made no serious effort to explain the difference in the context of a 
typical Fourth Amendment violation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 221. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
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language not essential to deciding the case and controversy before the 
court, is not binding.222 Further, the dissenting justices in Herring and 
Davis avoided characterizing the majority’s reasoning as a holding.223 
Thus, applied to the future Herring–Davis question about whether an 
officer’s own constitutional violation requires suppression, the cases 
offer no prescribed answer. 
First, in Herring there was no reason to address the level of 
culpability of the arresting officers because all parties agreed that the 
officers had acted reasonably.224 The controlling issue was not whether 
a police clerk acted negligently, but whether the police officers acted 
reasonably in relying on the report of an arrest warrant.225 The arresting 
officers made no error (negligent, reckless, grossly negligent, or 
otherwise) because they were following the information provided by the 
clerk.226 While the Court’s statement of a new standard about when the 
exclusionary remedy should apply was forcefully presented,227 the 
Court had no reason to apply the new standard to the facts.228 
The facts of Davis provide an even less appropriate situation to 
evaluate culpability, because all parties agreed that the officers were not 
only reasonable, but actually followed the established law.229 There was 
simply no need to inquire into the level of negligence as opposed to 
recklessness or any other level of culpability. Yet, Justice Alito 
                                                                                                                     
1056–58 (2005) (discussing the distinction between a holding and dicta); Marc McAllister, 
Dicta Redefined, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 161, 165–69 (2011) (discussing that dicta is 
traditionally not binding in the same manner as a holding). 
 222. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) (“It is a maxim not to be 
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the 
case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but 
ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for 
decision.” (quoting Cohens v. Virgina, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821))). 
 223. Moran, supra note 7, at 365 (“To put it simply, the language in Herring limiting the 
exclusionary rule to violations committed by grossly negligent (or worse) police officers looks 
like dicta. The four justices in dissent in Herring were careful not to refer to the culpability 
language in the majority opinion as a holding.”). 
 224. Id. at 376. 
 225. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701–02 (2009). 
 226. Id. at 695, 699 (citing the Eleventh Circuit’s finding that “the arresting officers in 
Coffee County ‘were entirely innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness’” (quoting United 
States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (2007))). 
 227. Id. at 701–03 (discussing the culpability standard for police officers under the 
exclusionary rule). 
 228. The case would have been more difficult if the arresting officer knew that the record 
system had not been updated and was not sure that there was a real warrant but wanted to arrest 
Herring anyway. In this circumstance, the court’s exploration into culpability would make a lot 
more sense. 
 229. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (“[A]ll agree that the officers’ 
conduct was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any 
way.”). 
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borrowed the reasoning of Herring and its newly developed standard 
without any real need for application.230 
That the Supreme Court has expressed a forceful idea about the 
limits of the exclusionary rule does not mean that trial courts are 
listening. The writing may be on the wall, but it has to be read (and 
accepted) for it to mean anything. Thus, one avenue open for litigators 
is to distinguish the existing precedent and to argue that the controlling 
weight of Herring and Davis is limited to the facts presented. Until the 
Supreme Court decides a case about the constitutional error of an officer 
making a misjudgment of a constitutional magnitude, the denial 
approach is still available for argument.  
B.  Acceptance: New Avenues for Litigation 
The new culpability-focused standard raises new considerations and 
concerns for courts at the trial level. These issues were not present 
under the traditional exclusionary rule regime, which did not focus on 
“constitutional blame.” In fact, it seems likely that the Supreme Court 
failed to consider the practical, trial-level consequences of its 
reasoning.231 Trial courts facing these questions and litigators making 
tactical choices must now rethink how the exclusionary rule operates. 
This section addresses ten possible consequences that result from the 
Hudson-Herring-Davis trilogy.  
1.  The Problem of Litigating Police Culpability 
To frame the analysis, it is helpful to consider a typical scenario that 
raises a stark Herring–Davis question.232 Take as an example a few fact 
patterns that have emerged from the routine stop-and-frisk practices in 
New York City.233 The New York Police Department (NYPD) has made 
over a half-million documented Terry stops a year.234 Many of those 
                                                                                                                     
 230. Id. at 2427–28.  
 231. See id. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 232. The generic version of this problem would involve, for example, a police officer who 
observes activity that causes him to investigate a suspect. Based on nothing more than a hunch, 
he stops a man. Based on the man’s reaction, the officer searches the man. Incident to the 
search, contraband is recovered. At the suppression hearing, the judge finds that the stop was 
without reasonable suspicion and the search without probable cause.  
 233. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: 
Redrawing “High Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 214–15 (2011) (describing stop-and-
frisk practices in New York City). 
 234. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 30–31 (1968) (holding that stop-and-frisk searches 
are appropriate when the police officer acts reasonably); Russ Buettner & William Glaberson, 
Courts Putting Stop-and-Frisk Policy on Trial, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/nyregion/courts-putting-stop-and-frisk-policy-on-trial.html; 
Editorial, Lingering Questions About Stop and Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes. 
40
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/2
2014] CONSTITUTIONAL CULPABILITY 663 
 
stops were made without reasonable suspicion and were thus 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.235 Many of those stops 
also involved un-Mirandized custodial interrogations.236 Two real-life 
examples, documented in testimony and evaluated by federal judge 
Shira Scheindlin overseeing the lawsuits, provides context for this 
analysis.237 While these stories arose in a civil context in which the 
parties sought preliminary injunctions, these events could easily arise in 
suppression hearings involving Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues. 
Because of the extensive testimony concerning the officers’ 
justifications for the stops and the judge’s credibility findings, the 
stories have sufficient detail to permit analysis of whether exclusion 
would be required under the new standard. 
a.  Charles Bradley’s Stop 
Charles Bradley was a fifty-one-year-old security guard and a 
resident of the Bronx.238 He went to visit his fiancée at her apartment. A 
resident who knew him and his relationship with his fiancée let him into 
the apartment building.239 The fiancée, who was deaf in one ear, did not 
open the apartment door, and so Mr. Bradley went back outside. While 
he was standing on the sidewalk outside the apartment building, an 
unmarked police van arrived. One of the police officers gestured for 
Bradley to come over. Police then questioned Bradley about possible 
                                                                                                                     
com/2010/02/19/opinion/19fri3.html; Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police 
Stops, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/12frisk.html; 
cf. Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronx-resistance-to-prosecuting-
stop-and-frisk-arrests.html; see also New Yorkers Speak Out on Stop, Question and Frisk Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES (August 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/08/21/nyregion/stop-
and-frisk-voices.html (polling 1,000 people on their opinion of stop and frisk in New York 
City). 
 235. See infra notes 248–249, 262 and accompanying text; see also Floyd v. City of N.Y., 
959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) (judging the constitutionality of the NYPD stop-and-frisk 
practices). 
 236. See infra note 265 and accompanying text. Many of the stops involved police 
questioning after an unconstitutional seizure. Again, the Miranda violation only occurs if the 
statements are used in trial. See infra note 265–66 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 483–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (lawsuit 
challenging the “Trespass Affidavit Program,” which involved police stops outside private 
apartment buildings on the suspicion of trespass); see also Davis v. New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 
405, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (suit against the New York Public Housing Authority challenging the 
policies and practices that the police department and the housing authority used to enforce 
prohibitions against trespassing on public housing property); Floyd v. City of N.Y., 813 F. Supp. 
2d 417, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (lawsuit challenging New York City police’s “policy, practice, 
and/or custom of unconstitutional stops and frisks . . . on the basis of race and/or national 
origin”). 
 238. Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 497. 
 239. Id. 
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criminal activities and contraband.240 He denied knowing anything, but 
the police searched him and arrested him for trespassing.241 Bradley was 
taken to the police station in the van, questioned again about unrelated 
criminal activity, strip-searched, booked for trespass, detained, and then 
released.242 Bradley insisted he had done nothing wrong. The 
prosecutors’ office dismissed the charges after Bradley’s lawyer 
provided an affidavit from the fiancée.243 
In contrast to Bradley’s version of events, Officer Santiago, the 
arresting officer, testified that the apartment at issue was a high-crime, 
high-drug area with many reported robberies and shootings.244 He 
testified that he observed Bradley at the end of the hallway inside the 
building “suspiciously walking back and forth for two or three minutes 
and disappearing.”245 The trial judge discredited this testimony because 
Officer Santiago would have had to make these alleged observations 
from a vantage point with an obstructed line-of-sight of Bradley.246 
Officer Santiago testified that he inquired about Bradley’s reason for 
being at the building, and arrested him for criminal trespass because he 
was unsatisfied with Bradley’s answers. Officer Santiago denied the 
custodial questioning and strip search.247 
The trial judge credited Bradley’s version of events and found 
Officer Santiago’s testimony to be contradicted by other evidence, 
including several factual inconsistencies and false statements.248 The 
trial judge determined that there was no reasonable suspicion for the 
stop.249 
                                                                                                                     
 240. Id. at 497–98. 
 241. Id. These types of trespassing arrests were the center of the “Clean Halls” lawsuit at 
issue in the Ligon litigation. Id. at 484. 
 242. Id. at 498. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 498–99. 
 246. Id. at 499. Officer Santiago would have made these observations from the police van, 
which was parked across the street almost thirty feet from the front door. Id. Further, his view 
would have been obstructed by the door, the entryway, and a hallway. Id. 
 247. Id. at 498–99. 
 248. Id. at 499 (“The paperwork Officer Santiago completed with regard to Bradley’s stop 
and arrest contained numerous, self-serving errors. In direct contradiction to his testimony at the 
hearing, Officer Santiago made the following statements on the arrest fact sheet: first, that he 
observed Bradley in the building for seven minutes; second, that he stopped Bradley inside the 
building; third, that he went to the apartment Bradley said he was visiting; and fourth, that the 
apartment was occupied. By all accounts, each of these statements was false. Officer Santiago’s 
credibility was further called into question by the fact that in 2002 or 2003 he lied within the 
scope of his police work by creating two improper summonses to help a friend.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 249. Id.  
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b.  Abdullah Turner’s Stop 
Abdullah Turner was a twenty-four-year-old man who visited a close 
friend in the Bronx.250 On the way to an engagement party, Mr. Turner 
and his friend stopped by another friend’s house to return a sweater.251 
Turner remained outside the apartment talking on the phone while the 
friend went into the apartment to return the sweater.252 As he walked 
outside, a police officer snatched Turner’s phone from his ear and asked 
him to provide identification and to explain what he was doing in the 
area. Turner was seized and questioned about criminal wrongdoing.253 
Despite providing identification and explaining his reason for waiting 
outside, Turner had his phone taken, and was arrested for criminal 
trespass.254 He was booked and spent the night in a holding cell.255  
Defending his actions, Officer Ramdeen, the arresting officer, 
testified that he saw Turner pacing aimlessly in the lobby for several 
minutes.256 When Turner exited the apartment building, Officer 
Ramdeen inquired about his purpose and Turner allegedly stated his 
friend was in the building trying to buy marijuana.257 The officer then 
arrested him for trespassing because he had no legitimate purpose in the 
building.258 
The trial judge credited Turner’s testimony.259 The judge found that 
“Turner’s responses to the officers’ questions were reasonable and 
unsuspicious.”260 The judge discredited the confession and found no 
grounds for suspicion or for the stop.261 
c.  The Problem Reconsidered 
In the above examples, the judge disbelieved the police officers’ 
testimony and found no reasonable suspicion for the stops.262 Had these 
cases arisen in a suppression hearing, the judge would likely have found 
the police officers’ actions unreasonable and thus unconstitutional under 
the Fourth Amendment.263 Under the old exclusionary rule, any 
                                                                                                                     
 250. Id. at 499–500. 
 251. Id. at 500. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 501. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 502. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 499, 502. 
 263. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 608–09 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In Weeks, 
Silverthorne, and Mapp, the Court based its holdings requiring suppression of unlawfully 
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recovered contraband would be subject to exclusion.264 In addition, both 
individuals were subjected to un-Mirandized custodial interrogations 
that potentially violated the Fifth Amendment.265 Again, under the old 
exclusionary rule, if the defendant made statements during 
unconstitutional interrogation and the government tried to use such 
statements during its case-in-chief at trial, then the court would exclude 
these statements. 
Under the new culpability-centered rule, however, exclusion is not 
automatic.266 Now, a court must consider whether exclusion will deter 
future constitutional violations, and if so, whether the action of that 
particular officer was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, or 
involved recurring or systemic negligence.267 As the next few 
subsections discuss, these new questions involve consideration of the 
particular police officer’s intent, knowledge, and experience, and the 
larger issues of a police department’s institutional practices—factors 
that courts did not have to consider under the old exclusionary rule. 
This, in turn, opens up questions about the need to obtain that 
information through discovery, pretrial disclosure, and cross-
examination. The following nine subsections address the new litigation 
considerations arising from this new exclusionary rule framework. 
2.  Litigating Culpability 
Under the traditional exclusionary rule, there existed no opportunity 
or need to assess an officer’s blameworthiness in violating 
constitutional rights.268 The Supreme Court stated in Whren v. United 
States that the subjective beliefs of the arresting officer are irrelevant for 
                                                                                                                     
obtained evidence upon the recognition that admission of that evidence would seriously 
undermine the Fourth Amendment’s promise. All three cases recognized that failure to apply the 
exclusionary rule would make that promise a hollow one . . . .”). 
 264. United States. v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951). 
 265. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463–65 (1966). Again, the violation would occur 
only if the statement was used against the defendant in the government’s case-in-chief at trial. 
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004). 
 266. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698  (2009). 
 267. See id. at 701–02; United States v. Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d 206, 215–16 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(holding that in failing to obtain a new warrant to search the second-floor apartment, law 
enforcement was “sufficiently deliberate” in its actions to meet the Herring standard); Virgin 
Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 417–18 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that an improvidently issued 
warrant where no probable cause for a search existed constituted sufficient “deliberate, reckless 
or grossly negligent” actions to establish Herring and Davis culpability and activate the 
exclusionary rule). 
 268. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (“Our cases make clear that an 
arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence 
of probable cause.” (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996))). 
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Fourth Amendment purposes.269 To determine the constitutional 
violation, courts were to follow an objective standard, and since the 
exclusionary remedy was linked to the violation, it too was controlled 
by an objective standard.270 Whether evil or inadvertent, the 
constitutional wrong and constitutional remedy turned on 
reasonableness, not blameworthiness.271 
Under a new culpability-centered standard, the objective nature of 
the analysis is not so clear-cut. To determine whether the officers in our 
two scenarios acted deliberately, recklessly, or whether the officers’ 
actions were part of a recurring systemic problem, the officers’ decision 
making becomes relevant.272 In simple terms, how do we know if 
Officer Santiago’s or Officer Ramdeen’s actions were blameworthy 
without analyzing either the officers’ knowledge of constitutional rules 
or their particular experience, including past violations of constitutional 
rights?273 If an officer regularly decided to ignore the reasonable 
suspicion standard, this might result in a different outcome than if the 
officer merely misunderstood the doctrine in practice.274 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                     
 269. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional reasonableness of [a] traffic stop[] 
[does not] depend[] on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”). In fact, a 
reasonable police officer standard was rejected in Whren. The Supreme Court criticized 
subjective tests, complaining that they were “exercise[s]” in “virtual subjectivity” that call for 
“speculati[on] about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable.” Id. at 814–15 (“[I]t 
seems to us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the 
collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a ‘reasonable 
officer’ would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation.”). 
 270. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); cf. McDonald v. United States, 
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (holding that the Fourth Amendment cannot be violated in “the 
absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the 
constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative”); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (holding that although 
knowledge gained by the government’s own wrong cannot be used before a court, knowledge 
gained from independent sources may be brought before a court like any other); Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 271. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (holding that the arresting officer’s state of mind is 
irrelevant). 
 272. Herring, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702–03. 
 273. The difficulty of determining deliberateness is evident in some of the Court’s earliest 
cases. For example, in Brewer v. Williams the majority had little difficulty stating that police 
deliberately elicited an incriminating statement in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See 430 
U.S. 387, 399 (1977) (“There can be no serious doubt, either, that Detective Leaming 
deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as—and 
perhaps more effectively than—if he had formally interrogated him.”). Yet the dissenting 
Justices argued that “[t]he police did nothing ‘wrong,’ let alone anything ‘unconstitutional.’” 
See id. at 438 (White, J., dissenting). 
 274. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 342 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Courts have 
frequently taken the ‘purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct’ into account in 
considering whether the taint of illegal action was sufficiently dissipated to render a confession 
admissible. In part, this inquiry has reflected conviction that particularly egregious misconduct 
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different outcomes might result between a case involving an officer who 
previously had evidence suppressed under similar circumstances and 
one involving an officer who had never been in that situation. Further, 
how do we know about recurring or systemic negligence without 
investigating past actions of the officers?  
Applying the mens rea terminology supplied by the Court in Herring 
and Davis, the first question is whether the officers deliberately stopped 
the individuals without reasonable suspicion. Presumably, there would 
not be any testimony that the actions were deliberate violations of the 
Constitution. But, can a judge who discredits an officer’s statements 
infer a deliberate violation based on untruthfulness? What if the officer 
testifies to an honest but mistaken understanding of trespass law? Is this 
reckless or grossly negligent? How does the pattern and practice of the 
other stops factor into a court’s analysis? 
These questions arise from the doctrinal uncertainty, which may in 
fact be useful for trial lawyers (especially defense counsel) to explore. 
Specifically, as will be discussed, new areas of cross-examination and 
argument are now open to determine the particular officer’s knowledge 
and experience. Similarly, the police department’s training on 
constitutional standards (in general) and the police officer’s training (in 
particular) now become subject to investigation. Each of these questions 
is addressed in turn. 
3.  Litigating Knowledge 
As Justice Roberts recognized in Herring, an officer’s particular 
knowledge of the law is relevant to the good-faith inquiry.275 To 
determine culpability, courts must first determine what a reasonable law 
enforcement officer knows about the Constitution (e.g., the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement of reasonable suspicion), then determine 
what this particular officer knows, and, finally, compare the objective 
actions of the officer against these two benchmarks of officer 
                                                                                                                     
must be deterred through particularly stern action.” (citation omitted) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975))); Kinports, supra note 107, at 775 (“Using the culpability rubric, an 
officer who proceeds to frisk a suspect without any belief that the suspect is armed is clearly 
acting with a culpability greater than negligence. The limitations of Terry are well known, and a 
police officer who conducts a frisk to uncover evidence or out of habit—and with no fear for her 
safety—cannot be considered merely negligent.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 275. Herring, 129 S. Ct. 695 at 703 (“We have already held that ‘our good-faith inquiry is 
confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer 
would have known that the search was illegal’ in light of ‘all of the circumstances.’ These 
circumstances frequently include a particular officer’s knowledge and experience, but that does 
not make the test any more subjective than the one for probable cause, which looks to an 
officer’s knowledge and experience.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984))). 
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knowledge.276 These additional steps were all unnecessary under the old 
exclusionary rule regime.277  
Going back to the two examples that begin this Part, a police officer 
stops a suspect based on an erroneous hunch (or no hunch) and then 
conducts a search. First, courts must now inquire about what a 
reasonable law enforcement officer knows about the Fourth 
Amendment.278 One might assume as a default that a reasonable police 
officer would know of current Fourth Amendment developments 
through professional training and experience.279 A responsible law 
enforcement officer should know that an unsubstantiated hunch is 
insufficient justification for a stop and that an officer needs probable 
cause for a full search.280 Similarly, one might assume that a reasonable 
police officer would know that custodial interrogation requires Miranda 
warnings or the resulting statements will be inadmissible.281 
The second step would be an inquiry into what this particular police 
officer knows about the Fourth Amendment (as compared to the 
reasonable police officer).282 This inquiry will require the police officer 
to demonstrate some familiarity with basic search and seizure law.283 
Unless we expect police officers to be legally trained, however, any 
                                                                                                                     
 276. Id. at 701–03. 
 277. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 278. Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance 
Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1529 n.226 
(2009) (“In the law-enforcement context, courts assess reasonable suspicion and probable cause 
based on a ‘reasonable officer’ standard. Such a standard considers the training and experience 
of the officer in determining whether there was sufficient indication that ‘criminal activity may 
be afoot.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968))); see also United States v. Salazar, 
609 F.3d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir. 2010) (“In other Fourth Amendment applications of the 
reasonable officer standard, we have characterized that reasonable officer as ‘prudent, cautious 
and trained.’” (quoting United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2001))). 
 279. See United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here is no 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for police who do not act in accordance with 
governing law. To create an exception here would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule, 
for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they properly understand the 
law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.”); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1470 
(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that it is not unreasonable to require law enforcement officers to know 
well-established current laws); Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 447 (Fla. 1992) (“Law 
enforcement officers are charged with knowledge of the law.”); see also Marceau, supra note 
141, 743 n.277 (2011) (discussing the Lopez-Soto holding). 
 280. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
123–24 (2000) (“The officer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”’ of criminal activity.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)). 
 281. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464–65 (1966). 
 282. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009). 
 283. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 
881, 896 (1991) (recognizing that police officers receive some Fourth Amendment training at 
the time they join the force, as well as further training through on-the-job experience). 
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further inquiry may be slightly unfair to officers because they would 
now be required to provide a legal justification for their stop and 
interrogation tactics, not just recite the facts of the stop.284 While 
difficult, this step may now be necessary. To prove a deliberate 
violation, one must first establish that the officer knew the law and 
intentionally violated it. To prove a reckless violation, one must 
establish the officer’s awareness of the risk of violating the 
Constitution, which again requires some analysis of the officer’s 
knowledge of the Constitution.285 
The third step would be to compare the reasonable officer standard 
to the particular officer in question and decide how this knowledge 
should affect the overall culpability analysis.286 This last step offers 
another level of complexity. A knowledgeable officer may be more 
culpable than an innocently ignorant officer. A willfully ignorant officer 
may be more reckless than an innocently ignorant officer. A truly 
ignorant officer may be, in fact, reckless in that lack of knowledge. 
For defense counsel, this new focus on knowledge requires a three-
fold inquiry in every suppression hearing. Counsel would inquire about 
general Fourth Amendment awareness of “reasonable police officers,” 
the particular standards and training of this officer287 and the officer’s 
police department,288 and then argue that the officer’s conduct did not 
match that of a reasonable officer. In the examples discussed above, this 
would involve cross-examination into the particular constitutional 
knowledge of the arresting officers. One could imagine a line of cross-
examination involving the officer’s knowledge of recent Fourth 
                                                                                                                     
 284. See, e.g., Recent Case, Fourth Amendment—Qualified Immunity—Third Circuit Holds 
that Police Officer’s Good Faith Reliance on Legal Advice Creates a Presumption of 
Reasonableness.—Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010), 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 2083, 2087–88 (2011) (“Although the doctrine of qualified immunity assumes that 
government officials are aware of clearly established law, there is a tension between the 
reasonableness of expecting that police officers ‘know the basic elements of the laws they 
enforce’ and the unfairness of requiring that they ‘be as conversant in the law as lawyers and 
judges who have the benefit not only of formal legal training, but also the advantage of 
deliberate study.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 255, 
258 (3d Cir. 2010))). 
 285. See supra Subsections II.B.1–2. 
 286. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. Complicating this analysis are credibility questions, 
which may be quite distinct from the knowledge issues. For example, in our two examples, the 
trial court disbelieved the officer’s testimony. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 499, 
502 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). To determine whether the officer intentionally or negligently arrested the 
men in the absence of any truthful testimony on which to base a decision is a rather difficult 
situation for the court.  
 287. For defense counsel this line of questioning might involve asking about any additional 
legal training the officer received. 
 288. For defense counsel this line of questioning might involve asking questions about 
training on legal issues provided by the police department, including training at the police 
academy and other additional in service trainings. 
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Amendment precedent, the law of trespass, the factors for reasonable 
suspicion, and legal conclusions reached from this understanding. 
Presumably, in New York City, these questions would include 
discussion of the federal lawsuits against the police department and data 
challenging the stop-and-frisk policy.289 Similarly, the legal rules of 
custody, interrogation, and Miranda protections for suspects subject to 
custodial interrogation might be avenues of inquiry.290  
For prosecutors, the focus on the particular officer’s knowledge may 
provide an opportunity to strengthen the constitutional argument at the 
suppression hearing. While not without risks, because the constitutional 
analysis and discussion is being generated by a non-lawyer, allowing 
the police officer to explain why he or she thought the stop was 
constitutional provides another argument to the court about the stop’s 
legitimacy. Normally, officers testify to the facts while the lawyers and 
judge apply the facts to the law. Under the new process, the officer—
through direct examination—would have the opportunity to explain his 
or her view of the law as it fits the facts at issue.291 This presents a 
potential benefit for a prosecutor with a sophisticated police witness. 
While this inquiry by both the defense and the prosecution are new 
steps in the process, they may not result in a different outcome. The 
final determination of objective culpability is with the judge, who must 
determine whether the officer’s actions under the Fourth Amendment 
conform to what a reasonable officer would do.292 In this way, the judge 
will determine whether the culpability warrants suppression by 
comparing the officer’s actual action to the actions that a reasonable 
officer would have taken. This is a new process that may ultimately lead 
to the exact same result. 
4.  Litigating Prior Experience 
The prior experience of the particular officer also now becomes an 
issue in determining culpability. As Justice Alito stated in Davis, 
suppression is unwarranted when police officers believe, based on an 
“objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful, 
or when their conduct involves only simple, ‘isolated’ negligence.”293 
                                                                                                                     
 289. See supra notes 234, 237 (discussing the federal lawsuits in New York City for stop-
and-frisk practices). 
 290. These questions might include inquiries into the training on Miranda practices, 
interrogation tactics, etc. 
 291. In many ways this process might be objected to because it would bolster the 
prosecution’s case. Under the new exclusionary rules, however, it would seem that this type of 
inquiry is now permissible. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. 
 292. See supra note 286 and accompanying text. The final decision or result of the court 
does not change, but only the inputs that go into that decision.  
 293. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011) (citation omitted). 
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As discussed above, the first part focuses on knowledge, the latter part 
on the experience of the particular officer. How can a court determine if 
the constitutional violation was “isolated” without evaluating the other 
similarly situated situations? Does the inquiry now require investigation 
into previous similar stops?294 Does the fact that a court has found 
previous stops unconstitutional become relevant?295 What if the police 
officer is notorious for illegal stop and frisks?296 Or the police unit?297 
Or the Department?298 What if the officer is under investigation for 
disciplinary violations concerning stop and frisks? Under the traditional 
suppression regime, such questions were irrelevant.299 Now, these 
questions may be critical to determining if the unconstitutional action 
was isolated or part of a recurring pattern. 
                                                                                                                     
 294. Interestingly, the data-driven nature of police work, with required documentation of 
all stops and contacts, may make this inquiry fairly easy. In some jurisdictions, every contact 
with citizens is supposed to be documented in formal reports. Thus, this database includes all of 
the reported stops, the justifications, and the results. This data could be used in Fourth 
Amendment litigation. See, e.g., SARAH V. HART, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME SCENE 
INVESTIGATION: A REFERENCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING 1 (June 2004), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/200160.pdf (“Critical to the administration of a crime is the 
objective recognition, documentation, collection, preservation, and transmittal of physical 
evidence for analysis.”). 
 295. Courts have found that prior police experience is relevant in justifying a stop. See, 
e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (recognizing that “a police officer 
views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (establishing that “due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable 
inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience”). 
Logically, a police officer’s prior failure to justify a stop should also be relevant. 
 296. See Jason Cherkis, Rough Justice, WASH. CITY PAPER (Jan. 7, 2000), 
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/18752/rough-justice (describing the tactics of four 
police officers who were known for frequently bending the law). 
 297. Scandals like the Rampart scandal in the Los Angeles Police Department provide 
cautionary lessons. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Case Takes On Momentum of Its 
Own, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/dec/31/news/mn-49335 
(discussing the “Pandora’s box of alleged police crimes and misconduct” of the Los Angeles 
Police Department’s Rampart Division); Henry Weinstein, Rampart Probe May Now Affect 
Over 3,000 Cases, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/dec/15/
news/mn-44050 (discussing the years and substantial resources needed to unravel the Rampart 
scandal). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545 
(2001) (describing the tolerated aggressive policing culture, departmental structure, disciplinary 
system, and its handling of excessive force cases as problems that plagued the Los Angeles 
Police Department); In the News: Rampart Scandal, L.A. TIMES (last visited Feb. 7, 2014), 
http://articles.latimes.com/keyword/rampart-scandal (search of the L.A. Times’s archive for 
articles on the Rampart scandal). 
 298. See Graham Rayman, The NYPD Police Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct, 
VILLAGE VOICE (May 4, 2010), http://www.villagevoice.com/2010-05-04/news/the-nypd-tapes-
inside-bed-stuy-s-81st-precinct/full (describing the pressure facing officers to manufacture 
statistics to support the numbers-driven stop-and-frisk program). 
 299. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996). 
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Certainly, an officer’s prior discipline on past stops might have a 
bearing on the officer’s level of deliberateness or recklessness.300 In 
fact, in discrediting Officer Santiago, the trial court referenced a prior 
disciplinary report.301 If a court finds the officer had been involved in 
ten prior stops without reasonable suspicion, this information should 
factor into evaluating the eleventh stop. If an officer had been 
disciplined because of prior inattention to constitutional restraints, this 
fact would bear on the isolated nature of the constitutional wrong. At 
the same time, if an officer had a long history of lawful, constitutional 
stops, this too would be relevant for the prosecutor to introduce to 
bolster the officer’s record. As might be imagined, this history of prior 
conduct will present a real difficulty for courts in terms of time, 
expense, and confusion. 
Presumably, courts will be quite reluctant to allow mini-hearings 
into the history of a particular officer’s negligent actions or past 
experience. Yet, that is exactly the process that seems to be suggested 
by the Supreme Court’s culpability-centered focus. Defense counsel 
will begin questioning officers on past acts. The questioning will in turn 
require courts to make decisions about the scope and extent of cross-
examination. For example, in the Ligon litigation,302 should prior 
trespass arrests be relevant? What about prior stops? What about 
testimony from citizens who claim to have been stopped by this 
particular officer? 
Similarly, prosecutors will also seek to bolster the professionalism of 
their testifying police witnesses. While before, past experience was 
irrelevant to whether the officer acted within constitutional constraints, 
a pattern of professional action free from disciplinary concerns now 
may be a relevant factor in a culpability analysis. Showing a pattern of 
constitutional practice may counteract the defense’s attempt to show a 
pattern of violations. The result, even when focused on the individual 
officer, offers a new and complex inquiry. 
5.  Litigating Institutional Wrongdoing 
In addition to inviting an inquiry into the training and past acts of the 
particular officer, the Supreme Court’s new standard also opens the 
door to questioning institutional policies and practices. This reality has 
existed since Leon, which recognized that the deterrent effect of the 
                                                                                                                     
 300. Borrowing from the qualified immunity cases, officers are considered to violate 
clearly established law when they are aware of the controlling law. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 
730, 738–39, 741 (2002). Here, the prior misconduct would play the role of clearly establishing 
the law. Prior misconduct puts the officer on notice of the possibility of violating the law in the 
future. 
 301. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see supra note 248. 
 302. See supra Subsections III.B.1.a–b. 
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exclusionary rule affects “the behavior of individual law enforcement 
officers or the policies of their departments.”303 The language 
“recurring or systemic negligence” can lead to even deeper inquiries 
into past acts or patterns of unconstitutional action.304 
In practice, this would mean that courts might be required to 
evaluate an ongoing police department practice distinct from the actual 
police–citizen encounter in court.305 How else might a court determine 
whether the constitutional violation was isolated or recurring, but to 
examine past practices and current policy? Though courts may be 
reluctant to undertake this inquiry, defense lawyers should challenge the 
systemic nature of the problem or they will risk losing the exclusionary 
remedy. For example, a defense lawyer facing an acknowledged 
constitutional violation and a prosecutor’s argument that the particular 
police officer acted without objective culpability would be remiss in not 
trying to paint the constitutional violation as either a failure to train or a 
systemic failure.306 To be clear, this would not be in the context of a 
constitutional tort suit, but in the ordinary Fourth Amendment 
suppression hearing.  
As discussed, recent lawsuits in New York City concerning the 
NYPD stop-and-frisk practices present a good example of the potential 
disruption this inquiry could bring. Between 2005 and June 2008, 88% 
of the 775,428 individuals stopped were neither cited nor arrested.307 In 
                                                                                                                     
 303. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 304. Laurin, supra note 17, at 684 (in critiquing Herring, “[N]o prior decision had held that 
evidence of departmental policies or other systemic circumstances that undermined Fourth 
Amendment compliance, standing alone, and in the absence of individual law enforcement 
misconduct, justify granting suppression”); Wayne R. LaFave, supra note 17, at 784 
(recognizing that the Supreme Court has never before used the term “systemic negligence”). 
 305. Cf. David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially Biased 
Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 102–06 (2007) (detailing racially 
biased police department practices); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of 
Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1236–37 (detailing the 
difficulty in requiring a plaintiff to establish a police department policy of choking citizens in 
order to have an injunction granted against the department). 
 306. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989) (“[T]he inadequacy of police 
training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to 
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into 
contact. . . . Only where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a 
municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined by our prior cases—can a city be liable for such a failure 
under § 1983.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (limiting municipal 
liability to unconstitutional policy or custom). But see Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Congress Needs to 
Repair the Court’s Damage to § 1983, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 29, 51 (2010) (discussing why 
“plaintiffs may want to hold supervisors personally responsible for the actions of their 
subordinates” rather than rely on a city policy to sue the municipality). 
 307. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, RACIAL DISPARITY IN NYPD STOPS-AND-FRISKS: 
THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRELIMINARY REPORT ON UF-250 DATA FROM 2005 
THROUGH JUNE 2008 1, 10, 15 (Jan. 15, 2009), http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report-CCR-NYPD-
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less than 2% of the frisks was a weapon recovered.308 Based on data 
collected between 2004 and 2009, “877,080 stops, or 31.2% of all stops 
citywide, [were] unjustified or of undeterminable legality.”309 So, 
imagine a typical suppression hearing involving the recovery of a 
weapon after an unconstitutional stop and frisk. Under a culpability-
centered exclusionary rule, the court would have to consider the 
knowledge and experience of the particular officer and then evaluate 
whether this unconstitutional frisk was part of a systemic pattern. Does 
this data support a recurring, systemic problem of stopping people 
without reasonable suspicion? Is it fair for the judge to take into account 
the actions of other officers in determining the objective culpability of 
this particular officer? How should courts incorporate the stated policies 
of the police department or government and the custom and practice that 
encourages these stops? What weight would this information have on 
determining the objective culpability of the officer or the department? 
None of these questions has an easy answer, yet all are potentially 
raised in the most basic of Fourth Amendment stops. 
As another example of the difference that a culpability-centered 
analysis might bring, the Ligon lawsuit on stop-and-frisk practices 
revealed that a training video on the definition of a Fourth Amendment 
seizure incorrectly stated the law.310 As this training video had been 
shown in almost every precinct and to almost every patrol officer, this 
systemic error in legal instruction could affect thousands of police 
stops.311 Should such a systemic misinstruction to all police officers be 
enough to demonstrate a systemic problem warranting exclusion? While 
this information was introduced into evidence as part of the civil 
lawsuit, arguably, these facts are now admissible in suppression 
hearings as they provide a necessary avenue for defense counsel to 
show a non-isolated example of negligence.312  
While taxing on the trial courts now responsible for litigating larger 
police-policy issues in suppression hearings, this new practice might 
have a positive impact on reforming certain areas of police practice. 
Civil tort principles will be litigated within suppression hearings, with 
the result that some practices may be deemed unconstitutional. This 
                                                                                                                     
Stop-and-Frisk.pdf. 
 308. Id. at 11–12. 
 309. Declaration of Jeffrey Fagan at 2, Floyd v. City of N.Y., No. 08-cv-01034 (SAS) 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011); see also NYPD Stop and Frisk - the Numbers and the Impact, CTR. 
FOR CONST. RTS., www.stopandfrisk.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2014). 
 310. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 534–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (detailing a 
series of errors in police training videos and materials involving the Fourth Amendment). 
 311. See id. at 534. 
 312. Since the Supreme Court’s language in Herring and Davis focused on “non-isolated 
negligence,” this type of systemic error will now be the focus of suppression hearings (rather 
than being confined to civil lawsuits). See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
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outcome is similar to the practice of founding era Fourth Amendment 
tort suits, which predated the rise of the exclusionary rule.313 Of course, 
from another perspective, this new focus will merely distract from the 
relevant issues surrounding the particular stop being litigated.  
6.  Expanded Discovery 
To facilitate the inquiry of recurring or systemic negligence—in this 
case meaning prior constitutional violations—new avenues of discovery 
might now be open for lawyers investigating the issue.314 The 
information about the New York City stops was developed from 
litigation by civil rights groups suing the city.315 To determine systemic 
negligence, litigants will need access to a host of new information 
                                                                                                                     
 313. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 785–
800 (1994) (discussing the Founding-era practice of civil tort suits as the primary remedy for 
Fourth Amendment violations). 
 314. See David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 455, 496 n.242 (1999) (recognizing that “[p]olice personnel files including police reports of 
prior incidents have been held to be discoverable in cases where the defendant is accused of 
violence against a police officer and the defendant is asserting self-defense”); see id. (“Police 
personnel files have been held to be properly discoverable for an in camera inspection to find 
impeachment material in non-violent criminal cases.”); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Accused’s 
Right to Discovery or Inspection of Records of Prior Complaints Against, or Similar Personnel 
Records of, Peace Officer Involved in the Case, 86 A.L.R.3d 1170, 1175 (1978) (“Within the 
cases in which a defendant, charged with an offense involving violence against a peace officer 
alleged by the defendant to have been the aggressor, sought discovery or inspection of the 
officer’s personnel records, such disclosure has occasionally been totally disallowed but usually 
has been at least partially allowed, either in the form of in camera inspection by or in the 
presence of the trial judge or in the form of direct disclosure to the defendant.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 315. See supra note 237 (discussing the federal lawsuits in New York City). This 
information will not be available in other cities, and only involves one aspect of the problem. 
Observing how similar discovery requests have been litigated in § 1983 lawsuits, however, 
provides some clues as to how this process will evolve. See, e.g., Ryan v. Bd. of Police 
Comm’rs, 96 F.3d 1076, 1084 (8th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging the availability of discovery and 
the importance of meeting discovery demands in a police misconduct case); Wolfe v. Green, 
257 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.W. Va. 2009) (requiring police to provide requested documents); 
King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 195–96 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (allowing discovery of police 
records); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090, 1115 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (“Under § 1983, the 
extent of supervisors’ knowledge of and participation in the acts of their subordinates 
determines the scope of their liability and ipso facto the municipality’s liability. The essence of 
plaintiff’s complaint is that the supervisory defendants were grossly negligent or deliberately 
indifferent in failing to provide adequate training, supervision and discipline to officers on the 
police force . . . . To prove this allegation, the court agrees with plaintiff that it would be high 
[sic] relevant, indeed critical, to establish what the defendants knew regarding allegations of 
police brutality and when they knew it.”). See generally MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE 
MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 8:1–8:15 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing discovery 
considerations for § 1983 lawsuits against police officers). 
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sources.316 First, litigants will need data on the particular officer 
involved.317 This will involve data on past stops, citizen complaints, 
internal police complaints, disciplinary reports, civil lawsuits, and 
maybe even past legal determinations.318 Second, as a systemic matter, 
litigants will need data on the number of constitutional violations in the 
jurisdiction, which would include those formally found by the court, 
those informally discovered by the prosecutors, and those litigated in 
successful civil rights actions.319 In addition, for courts to evaluate a 
reasonable officer’s knowledge about constitutional rights (to determine 
deliberate or reckless action), they will need documentation about 
training programs, standards of conduct, and accountability mechanisms 
in the jurisdiction.320  
As might be imagined, this additional information will be 
burdensome to produce for a criminal suppression hearing. In addition, 
it will require extensive litigation before admission. Yet under a 
culpability-centered standard, this inquiry appears to be permissible. 
Police officers are repeat players in the criminal justice system as they 
make hundreds of stops a year and leave a significant paper trail about 
these contacts.321 Individually and collectively, this data will now be 
                                                                                                                     
 316. Cf. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (3d Cir. 1996) (allowing recurring 
pattern of excessive force claims to be presented to the jury); Vann v. City of N.Y., 72 F.3d 
1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“To prove such deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that 
the need for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was 
obvious. . . . An obvious need may be demonstrated through proof of repeated complaints of 
civil rights violations; deliberate indifference may be inferred if the complaints are followed by 
no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investigate or to forestall further 
incidents.” (citations omitted)). 
 317. Interestingly, New York City and Philadelphia have been collecting that data as a 
result of existing settlements with plaintiffs who sued over police practices. In other 
jurisdictions, the rise of crime data analysis has led to new crime data collection methods and 
recording systems. Many major metropolitan areas have sophisticated crime-mapping systems 
that require the collection of information about each arrest, contact, and police activity. See 
Ferguson, supra note 233, at 214–15, 219–20 (discussing New York City’s CompStat program 
for collecting empirical data on crime and crime mapping). 
 318. See G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct 
Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 752–54 (1999) (“The specifics of proof in 
discipline cases often require a painstaking gathering and analysis of much detailed evidence 
concerning the disciplinary process over a period of several years before and after the incident 
in question.”). 
 319. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. 
Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 3 
(2003) (discussing an investigation by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice in response to fifteen young black men being shot and killed by the Cincinnati Police 
Department over a six-year period in the 1960s). 
 320. All of this data exists. The issue is requiring police and prosecutors to provide it at the 
request of defense counsel challenging a particular stop. 
 321. See Stuntz, supra note 283, at 896. 
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subject to discovery and litigation. 
7.  Experts: A Reasonable Police Officer Standard 
Experts on police training and knowledge may also now be needed 
in suppression hearings.322 In a traditional suppression hearing focused 
on the constitutional violation, there was no real place for an expert 
opinion on how a reasonable officer would have acted.323 Judges have 
been and are perfectly capable of determining existing constitutional 
standards and whether the Constitution was violated. However, if the 
inquiry is now how the particular officer’s actions compare to a 
reasonable officer’s actions, then new information sources about the 
reasonable officer standard are required.324  
One can easily imagine that in any suppression hearing in which a 
court must determine objectively culpable wrongdoing, both sides will 
hire experts to testify about what a reasonable police officer would do 
and why the other side is wrong.325 These experts could be former 
police officers or current criminologists who might explain why a 
certain action or certain way of thinking rises to the level of culpable 
                                                                                                                     
 322. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (discussing expert testimony); Geoffrey P. Alpert, Effective 
Use of Expert Witnesses in Police Misconduct Cases: The Changing Role of the Expert Witness 
(July 2002) (unpublished presentation, Association of Trial Lawyers of America), 2 Ann. 2002 
ATLA-CLE 1817 (“To show a mistake or wrongdoing that is negligent or even grossly 
negligent, an expert can evaluate the actions of the officer and other people and determine 
whether the behavior did or did not comply with proper standards or practices.”). 
 323. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155–56 (4th Cir. 2006); Young v. 
City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2005); Alvarado v. Oakland 
Cnty., 809 F. Supp. 2d 680, 688–89 (E.D. Mich. 2011); Young v. City of Centreville, 523 
N.E.2d 621, 628–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 324. This may result in the scope of expert testimony that is regularly seen in § 1983 cases 
against police officers. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 6.01 (2013) (“A wide variety of experts have testified in § 1983 actions. For 
example, experts have described and explained law enforcement operations and correctional 
procedures . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); see also Eileen R. Kaufman, Choosing the Insidious 
Path: West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey and the Importance of Experts in Civil 
Rights Litigation, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 57, 61 (1991–1992) (“There is no serious 
dispute that experts are an essential expense when litigating civil rights cases.”). 
 325. See AVERY ET AL., supra note 315, at § 11:15 (“The use of expert testimony regarding 
proper police practices is now regularly entertained by the courts. The number of retired police 
administrators, criminologists, and other professionals with expertise who are willing to testify 
in police misconduct cases is growing rapidly and these experts are available in most sections of 
the country.”); Alpert, supra note 322 (“[A]n expert can rely on ‘national standards’ as 
published by membership organizations (e.g., International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
Police Executive Research Forum), the agency’s own policy, or policies in surrounding 
jurisdictions. Similarly, training materials from national, local, or regional outlets can be used to 
establish standards. Once the expert has developed the standard by which an officer should act, 
the expert can evaluate the officer’s behavior in its proper context, come to a conclusion about 
the level of “negligence” or “recklessness,” and determine if these actions were a proximate 
cause of the injury.”). 
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action.326 Obviously, like the practice of experts in civil contexts, both 
sides would likely call conflicting experts.327 These experts might 
further open the door for additional discovery, similar to the role of the 
expert in other legal contexts. As police departments and practices are 
localized, there would be questions of local practices versus national 
practices as well as a question of how to find objective benchmarks to 
evaluate the rather messy reality of modern police–citizen encounters.328 
While most judges would consider such expert testimony unnecessary, 
it would be far more relevant under the new rule than under the 
traditional exclusionary rule. 
8.  Establishing Deterrence on the Record 
The core logic underlying Hudson, Herring, and Davis involves the 
importance of deterrence.329 If a particular act of exclusion will deter 
future violations, then it follows that the evidence should be 
excluded.330 Usually, the deterrence rationale focuses on general 
deterrence, but it can also involve specific acts of deterrence.331 In 
particular, the focus of specific deterrence may lead to a new line of 
questioning in this two-tier suppression context. 
For defense counsel this might necessitate a change in tactics to 
establish on the record that an acknowledged constitutional wrong 
might deter this particular officer from such wrongdoing in the future. 
As an example, assume that the trial court has found a Fourth 
Amendment violation (first tier), and the parties are now arguing about 
                                                                                                                     
 326. AVERY ET AL., supra note 315, § 11:15 (“An expert may be called to testify about a 
wide variety of police practices. Whether municipalities have provided proper training to 
officers, whether supervisors have properly reviewed prior complaints of misconduct, and 
whether the policies of a department with respect to supervision and discipline are proper are 
probably best litigated with the use of experts.”); Taylor, supra note 318, at 752 (“Often, a 
police expert, either a sympathetic local (ex) police official, or one who specializes in police 
misconduct cases, may be required to help interpret and evaluate the evidence, both for 
plaintiff’s counsel, and, later, for the jury.”). 
 327. See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and 
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 34–39 (2000) (discussing the historical development of using expert 
witnesses to represent both sides). 
 328. See generally AVERY ET AL., supra note 315, § 11:15 (“The utility of expert testimony 
in understanding police operations is evident from the training which police officers themselves 
are given to prepare them for their jobs. In all responsibly managed police departments, officers 
are required to undergo specialized training before they are assigned to street patrol. The need 
for sophisticated and thorough training is well recognized.”). 
 329. See supra Part I. 
 330. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (“By refusing to admit evidence gained 
as a result of [unconstitutional] conduct, the courts hope to instill,” both in “particular 
investigating officers” and “in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the 
rights of an accused.”). 
 331. Id. 
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the level of objective culpability of the particular officer (second tier). 
Defense counsel asks the officer whether he would knowingly violate 
the Fourth Amendment. The officer responds, “No, of course not.” 
Defense counsel then asks, “You know that the court found your actions 
in this case violated the Fourth Amendment.” The officer says, “Yes.” 
Then, defense counsel finishes by asking, “Knowing what the court held 
about your actions, would you knowingly violate the Constitution 
again?” Presumably, the officer would answer that he would not violate 
the Constitution in the future, and the defense could argue that this 
officer has been specifically deterred from future constitutional 
violations. Deterrence, normally a speculative concept, has been proven 
on the record. 
Getting an officer to admit on cross-examination that: (a) he or she 
would not purposely violate the Fourth Amendment; (b) he or she 
understands that his or her actions did violate the Fourth Amendment; 
and (c) if faced with the same circumstance, he or she would not repeat 
the error, removes the case from the Herring–Davis logic of deterrence. 
A trial court could not simply rely on a lack of objective culpability if 
the principle of specific deterrence would apply in the particular case 
(because it could be proved that the officer would, in fact, be deterred in 
the future). In simple terms, if one can prove specific deterrence on the 
record, one can avoid a generalized culpability inquiry by the court. 
9.  Seeking New Remedies 
The Supreme Court’s decoupling of constitutional violations and the 
remedy of suppression does not necessarily mean that constitutional 
violations will go unremedied.332 While from a defendant’s perspective 
suppression of the evidence is usually the preferred choice, it does not 
exhaust the options.333 Without exclusion, a court may be willing to 
consider other methods of police accountability. One potential remedy 
would be to inform the jury of the constitutional violation during 
trial.334 The jury would be instructed that the evidence was recovered in 
                                                                                                                     
 332. See supra Section I.A. 
 333. Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006) (“Citizens and lawyers 
are much more willing to seek relief in the courts for police misconduct . . . . The number of 
public-interest law firms and lawyers who specialize in civil-rights grievances has greatly 
expanded.”), with id. at 611 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To argue that there may be few civil suits 
because violations may produce nothing ‘more than nominal injury’ is to confirm, not to deny, 
the inability of civil suits to deter violations.”). 
 334. See, e.g., Elizabeth N. Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1450, 1452, 1459 (2006) (proposing jury instructions for Brady violations, which are 
triggered when prosecutors fail to turn over favorable information to defense counsel); Cynthia 
E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 416, 422 (2010) (suggesting a jury instruction for a Brady 
violation as a punitive sanction); Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly 
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violation of the Constitution.335 In this way, the negligence of the officer 
would be aired in court, but it would not result in exclusion of the 
evidence. 
Similar instructions on missing evidence or other government errors 
are regularly given to juries deciding cases.336 In most cases, the fact 
that a constitutional violation occurred in obtaining evidence will have 
no direct effect on the verdict. In some cases, however, the police 
officer’s actions might affect credibility determinations. In others, the 
violation might affect the weight given to the prosecution’s evidence. 
The justification for this instruction is not to invite the jury to punish 
the officer but to provide a clear and formal consequence for 
governmental wrongdoing. A prosecutor will have to address an 
unpleasant fact that weakens the case, which itself is a deterrent.337 
In addition, if the argument against the exclusionary rule is that it 
undermines the truth-seeking nature of trial, this truthful admission of a 
constitutional violation will serve that larger interest.338 The 
Constitution has been violated. Acknowledging that fact in open court 
serves several process-oriented goals, including a measure of personal 
and community accountability for the offending officer.339 
                                                                                                                     
Convicted: Judicial Sanctions for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893, 
2948 (2009) (“In addition to excluding forensic evidence, a new trial sanction could also include 
a strongly worded adverse inference or ‘missing evidence’ instruction.”). 
 335. This could be done during jury instructions or during closing argument. 
 336. See, e.g., One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Broad. Dev. Grp., Inc., 147 Fed. App’x 535, 540 
(6th Cir. 2005) (“Under Kentucky law, a missing evidence instruction . . . is appropriate when 
there exists a genuine question of fact as to whether one party negligently destroyed or lost 
evidence relevant to an essential element of an opposing party’s case.”); Niehus v. Liberio, 973 
F.2d 526, 529–30 (7th Cir. 1992) (allowing a missing-evidence instruction in a police 
misconduct lawsuit); United States v. Steve, Nos. 89-3223, 89-3224, 1990 WL 194509, at *2 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (“When the prosecutor loses or leaves behind important evidence, the trial 
court may find sanctions in order or a ‘missing evidence’ instruction warranted, i.e., a charge 
that the jury may infer that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the 
government. Relevant considerations for the trial judge, in deciding what action to take when 
the government fails to preserve evidence, include ‘the degree of negligence or bad faith 
involved, the importance of the evidence lost, and the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.’” 
(quoting United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1971))); State v. 
Fulminante, 975 P.2d 75, 93 (Ariz. 1999) (“When police negligently fail to preserve potentially 
exculpatory evidence, an instruction . . . permits the jury to infer that the evidence would have 
been exculpatory.”). 
 337. As the Hudson majority was concerned with finding other methods of accountability 
short of suppression, this truth-oriented instruction may serve the needs of both accountability 
and truth. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–99. 
 338. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (“The very integrity of the judicial 
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the 
framework of the rules of evidence.”). 
 339. Recording and formalizing this admission of constitutional error will also make it 
easier for future litigants to prove a recurring pattern of negligence (which is now one of the 
considerations post Herring-Davis). 
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10.  Litigating Attenuation 
The final issue is how to address the Supreme Court’s attenuation 
discussion in Hudson.340 Justice Scalia’s focus on “interest attenuation” 
requires an evaluation of the underlying interests protected by the 
violated constitutional right.341 Lower courts have remained remarkably 
silent on the issue, perhaps confused as to how one would evaluate 
constitutional interests.342 Scholars that attempt to address the possible 
ramifications generally signal alarm.343 Yet the puzzle of litigating the 
issue remains. 
For example, consider again a court confronted with the 
unconstitutional stop and questioning of the two individuals in the 
NYPD cases. What is the purpose of Terry v. Ohio, such that 
contraband recovered after an unconstitutional stop can be evaluated? Is 
it security, privacy, or dignity?344 All of these purposes are in some 
measure part of the Fourth Amendment’s protection on the streets.345 
But how would these interests be determined in litigation? Further, as 
Professor Davies has argued, depending on one’s view of the interests 
protected by Miranda, many of the traditional Miranda protections 
could be circumvented by simply redefining the interests.346 Broadly 
speaking, if the interests underlying a constitutional right were at issue 
in every suppression hearing, courts would be forced to evaluate 
significant constitutional theories even in ordinary suppression hearings. 
                                                                                                                     
 340. See supra Section II.C. 
 341. A precursor argument for attenuation can be seen in arguments like those of Chief 
Justice Burger in Brewer v. Williams, in which he argued that the purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment would not be furthered by suppression of evidence. 430 U.S. 387, 426 (1977) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“In any event, the fundamental purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to 
safeguard the fairness of the trial and the integrity of the factfinding process. In this case, where 
the evidence of how the child’s body was found is of unquestioned reliability, and since the 
Court accepts Williams’ disclosures as voluntary and uncoerced, there is no issue either of 
fairness or evidentiary reliability to justify suppression of truth. It appears suppression is 
mandated here for no other reason than the Court’s general impression that it may have a 
beneficial effect on future police conduct; indeed, the Court fails to say even that much in 
defense of its holding.” (footnote omitted)). 
 342. See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 692 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) 
(discussing three different cases in the Sixth Circuit in which the court did not find attenuation 
to be a convincing reason to avoid suppression). 
343. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 215, at 1233–35; Tomkovicz, supra note 50, at 394–95; 
Tomkovicz, supra note 71, at 1828–30. 
 344. See supra notes 204–06 and accompanying text. 
 345. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968) (“The Fourth Amendment provides that ‘the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .’ This inestimable right of 
personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner 
closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs.” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV)). 
 346. Davies, supra note 215, at 1233–35. 
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Litigants would be advised to argue for a conception of the 
constitutional right that fits their client’s interest. Perhaps as part of a 
motion to suppress (or a responsive motion), an argument will need to 
be crafted establishing the constitutional interests protected. Though this 
step was unnecessary in traditional suppression hearings, it is now 
incumbent upon lawyers to create the link between the interest protected 
by the constitutional protection and suppression of evidence. For 
example, in a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing, a cross-
examination should include questioning the officer about why certain 
constitutional restraints exist, how officers are trained on reasonable 
expectations of privacy, and how officers know that violation of such 
legal protections would warrant suppression. These arguments will 
likely be contested and will need to be part of the record developed by 
the parties. Courts will be in an even more delicate position of trying to 
divine the interests protected by the various constitutional protections 
knowing that any constitutional conclusions will be subject to appellate 
review. 
CONCLUSION: CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE 
On the ground, constitutional changes take time to take hold. 
Sweeping pronouncements that redefine constitutional concepts can 
sometimes remain ignored in practice. The Supreme Court has taken the 
first steps to redefine the exclusionary rule. How litigants answer the 
questions in this Article will determine the next steps.  
The concerns with applying the new exclusionary rules are both 
practical and substantive. Practically, a two-tiered suppression hearing 
analysis requires additional inputs to determine the level of culpability. 
Even if it does not change the ultimate outcome of suppression, it will 
change the process. This, in turn, will mean additional work for trial 
courts and additional strategic decisions for lawyers. Defense counsel 
will be wise to consider whether this new culpability focus opens new 
avenues for cross-examination, discovery, and expert testimony. 
Prosecutors will be wise to limit the scope of this discovery and to 
prepare their officers for an additional culpability-based cross-
examination. Police departments will be required to collect more 
information about possible systemic problems and to develop standards 
for a “reasonable police officer.” 
Substantively, the changes will narrow the reach of the exclusionary 
rule. Whether good or bad from a policy perspective, it is a significant 
change. One can imagine that such a system may incentivize courts to 
find no constitutional violation in order to avoid a lengthy culpability 
inquiry. Alternatively, a bifurcated process could develop such that 
culpability litigation only occurs after a finding of constitutional 
wrongdoing, much like a penalty phase in a capital punishment trial.  
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Any prediction of the future of the exclusionary rule must be based 
on the past pattern of cases. As discussed, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that the exclusionary rule is no longer an automatic remedy. What 
replaces it and how to determine when it should be applied is the 
challenge for judges and lawyers on the ground. Lower courts have 
already begun addressing these questions with mixed results.347 
While the pure Herring–Davis case has not yet emerged, it soon 
will. When it does, litigants and judges will have to start defining some 
of the terms offered by the Supreme Court. Creative litigants will begin 
pushing the boundaries of discovery and investigating deliberate and 
systemic problems. Perhaps this will open up new methods of police 
accountability involving the collection of new data about constitutional 
violations. Or, perhaps more likely, this change will functionally 
eviscerate the traditional exclusion remedy as overburdened defense 
lawyers and public defenders will be unable to litigate systemic issues 
in individual cases. Courts will also have to interpret the Supreme 
Court’s intent in including ill-defined new culpability standards into the 
exclusionary rule. How far trial courts will go to litigate culpability is 




                                                                                                                     
 347. See Claire Angelique et al., What Herring Hath Wrought: An Analysis of Post-Herring 
Cases in the Federal Courts, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 231–33 (2011). 
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